The Far Right in Europe

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The far right in France today</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-modernists in search of modernity</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The far right in North Europe</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Extreme Right and the Crisis in Slovenia</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rise of the far right in Hungary</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The case of Golden Down</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extending the combat zone</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent developments in the French far right</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Euro-elections and the need for political caution and realism</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Euro-vote epic over bar the shouting</em></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems for the debate: how the radical right reacts with the</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conservative social forces in Poland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine: moving common opinion right</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian extreme and radical right wing: an overview</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right wing extremism in Austria</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The far right in France today

Tina Louis

What are the characteristics of the French far right today? How much of a role does the Front National play? How many groups are there on the fringes and what do they really stand for? To answer these questions we need to take into account the fact that the nationalist milieu in France has experienced upheavals in recent years that have altered its make-up. At the same time, the perception of the nationalist movement by the public has not really changed. Yet in order to effectively fight against the far right it is necessary to have a good understanding of the movement, including of both how it evolved over the last few decades and its current state. This is essential if the anti-fascist response is to reflect the reality on the ground.

The main far-right organisation is the Front National (FN), which has been at the epicentre of the nationalist nebula for more than thirty years. Originally founded in 1972 by neo-fascists from Ordre nouveau (New Order) and various nationalist factions it quickly became ‘the baby’ of Jean-Marie Le Pen, its then president. The party celebrated its first successes in the early 1980s, bringing together various factions of the French extreme right (Catholic fundamentalists, former collaborators from the Vichy regime, supporters of French Algeria) as well as other minor parties and radical groups including solidarists, nationalist revolutionaries, neo-nazis and pagans. The party underwent a split in 1998, which significantly weakened it during the 2000s; at the same time, although the leader was getting older, he avoided appointing a successor. However, since the Tours Congress in 2010, Marine Le Pen, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s youngest daughter, has taken up the helm and has been determined to free her party from the historical movements of French nationalism so as to appear more modern and less extremist.

The arrival of Marine Le Pen as president of the FN not only settled the matter of leadership, but that of the future of the party. The change in leadership has provided the FN with wind in its sails, as Le Pen’s daughter has been able to normalise her party and include it in the French political landscape. It seems as if she has succeeded where her father (deliberately?) failed for decades. This was made possible by developing a more conformist approach (especially by distancing the party from anti-Semitism). At the same time, the party has also expanded its scope of action beyond the issues of security and immigration so as to appear to provide a credible alternative to the political parties in government, and not just as a political troublemaker. This evolution of the FN sounded the death knell for Republican anti-fascism, which had staked everything on side-lining the FN (which has been called the ‘demonization’ of the FN) and raised new questions such as ‘How should a
party by countered that causes less and less outrage?’ How can a party by opposed that is turning its back on militancy and only exists at the ballot box or in the media? What is the best way of reacting to the offensive of the FN in areas where it might have been least expected to take root?

From an ideological point of view, however, the FN has not changed that much. Designed from the outset to be the institutional, electoral and consensual expression of the far right within a strategy aimed at seizing power, the FN has always perfectly adapted to social democracy and a market economy and does not question the principles of this system. One example of this occurred in the 1980s, when the conservative right allied itself with the FN during municipal and parliamentary elections, such as in Dreux, the first major city to be won by the FN with the support of the local right-wing. This alliance was not openly criticised by the national leadership. When the FN gained prominence in the 1990s a Republican containment strategy was deployed. Nevertheless, agreements were concluded at a local level, and specifically in the regional elections of 1998. Today the FN has become a common sight in elections and the political discourse of the right has become more hard-line: the majority faction within the UMP (Union for a Popular Movement) is la Droite Forte (the Strong Right), which was co-founded in 2012 by Guillaume Peletier, a former FN member. The party’s slogan is ‘We are proud to be French, we are proud to be right-wing’. Despite this, any alliance, even a circumstantial one, has been ruled out by both sides because of the taboo it would break within the right-wing and because of the pride the FN takes in its ‘political virginity’, a status that differentiates the party from governing parties. In fact, the enlargement strategy of Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement Bleu Marine was limited to a few inconsequential alliances with small sovereignist parties.

The FN supports an ethnocratic liberalism (the term is borrowed from the British historian Roger Griffin) in which people ‘born and bred French’ deserve more protection than foreign nationals (this is the FN’s policy of ‘national priority’, which replaced its previous policy of ‘national preference’). At the same time, the FN promises to renew the social order from within the Republican framework, but with a reactionary perspective on most social issues that includes reinstating the death penalty, and defending traditions, etc.

Furthermore, if immigration and security issues are no longer recurrent topics as they were in the past, this is because they are now implicitly associated with the policies of the FN. Their supporters recognise this and the FN’s positions on these two issues are still the main drivers behind the FN vote. After years of praising ultraliberalism, the FN has changed tack and now favours the statism that prevails in economic and social matters. This is merely one way the FN has tried to expand its electoral base by continuing the offensive against the left as a means of attracting
people who feel betrayed by the institutional left, as it did in the past with voters disappointed with Sarkozy.

An issue that must be considered is the willingness of governing parties to take up the ideas put forward by the FN. Racist statements made by Brice Hortefeux (UMP) – who was minister of the interior at the time and a close friend of the former president, Nicolas Sarkozy – the drastic deportation measures of Manuel Valls (Socialist Party), before he became prime minister, and his recent racist criticism of Roma are only some of the most glaring examples of the trivialisation of the far right’s extremist ideas within the uppermost echelons of the state.

The institutionalisation and normalisation of the FN freed up a political space on the right that the party had occupied for decades. But the extreme right did not simply wait to be renewed by Marine Le Pen. On the contrary, it was when the FN seemed moribund in the early 2000s that the situation of the extreme right started to change.

The French far right currently consists of a rather complex, even confusing nebula, but from the early 1980s to the early 2000s it was organised fairly simply. The FN occupied the greater part of the political and public space within this school of thought, relegating to the periphery various factions whose margin for manoeuvre was very limited. Some examples of these organisations include the Oeuvre Française, the GUD (Groupe Union Défense, a far-right student group), the Parti Nationaliste Français et Européen – PNFE (French and European Nationalist Party), the Troisième Voie (Third Way), and Unité Radicale – UR (Radical Unity). Although some of these eventually joined the FN, others opted for ideological escalation and violence, even terrorism (such as the attacks by the PNFE against Sonacotra shelters in 1988). Jean-Marie Le Pen’s stranglehold on the FN at the time and his media success left little room for competitors, and forced other factions into submission or the political wilderness.

The FN had its best years in the mid-1990s, both electorally and in terms of activism. During this period, it functioned as a war machine with a security service largely made up of former security personnel; but the party’s greatest strength was its many activists who could be mobilised for any type of event. The 1990s were also marked by an upsurge in right-wing violence, which claimed several lives, all French nationals of foreign origin. Several activists or supporters of the FN were involved in racially motivated murders. In 1998, the FN experienced a serious internal crisis, and Bruno Megret, the deputy leader of the party, defected with numerous senior members and activists to create the Mouvement National Républicain – MNR (National Republican Movement). This split, which also marked the end of the hegemony of the FN in the French far right, enabled some nationalist
movements to reenlist members and activists from Le Pen’s party who had become disenchanted with the tensions between the FN and the MNR.

Furthermore, September 11, 2001 and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had a strong impact on the political landscape of the far right. On one side, there was a traditional far-right movement sticking to its fundamental principles; on the other side, there were movements ready to ally themselves with other parties on certain occasions. This represented an unprecedented moment in French right-wing politics. In the summer of 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen got through to the second round of the presidential election. This caused great upset throughout the country but at the same time appeared to represent a swan song of a party on its last legs. Nationalist activists took advantage of the dissolution of the group Unité radicale to launch a new kind of nationalist movement – the Bloc identitaire (identity Bloc) – which gave itself ten years to become the leading nationalist force in France. Since the early 2000s, the identity movement has appeared in a number of guises and developed new practices that have exploited media coverage and blurred political lines. They have done this by abandoning some minor traditional nationalist practices as well as providing the media with ‘sound bites’. This has included opening up popular soup kitchens that serve soup with pork or aperitifs with sausages and wine; but it has also built unexpected alliances, such as with Riposte laïque (Secular Answer), a movement that developed in 2007 from secular leftist circles and which defended Islamophobia with appeals to secularism.

The rise of Marine Le Pen as the leader of the FN and her new strategy disenchanted some young far-right activists and radical nationalists within the party even if the party still appeals to the ambitions and interests of many nationalists, especially when it comes to elections. Although the party is no longer able to cover the walls of the cities of France with political posters or have thousands of people flood the streets as in the past, because it lacks grassroots activists, the FN has enlisted numerous new members; but they are unwilling to get their hands dirty. This is of little importance, however, since Marine Le Pen’s strategy is focused primarily on the media and Le Pen has proven to be media-savvy, just like her father. She is on television or radio every day and has managed to rally media personalities such as Gilbert Collard, something her father never managed to do. She organises witch hunts of all those who oppose her, are too radical or who hinder her media crusade and the political normalisation of the FN. This leads to the question whether mainstreaming the FN and the new policies spearheaded by its president have left any room for radical groups. Some members of these movements are in agreement with the FN, such as the 1990 and 2010 generations of the GUD. In Marine Le Pen’s close entourage one can find well-known personalities such as Frederic Châtillon, leader of the GUD in the 1990s and an out-and-out anti-Semite, or Alex Lousteau, also a former member of the GUD.
But Marine Le Pen is not the only person who occupies the media arena. Another phenomenon appeared in the 2000s and further complicated matters: the emergence of far right media personalities, who presented themselves as from the Left, such as the comedian Dieudonné, or the TV commentator Alain Soral. They deploy a deliberately muddled discourse where ‘anti-globalisation’ and ‘anti-Zionism’ are nothing but a cover for anti-Semitism, and highly reactionary ideas (male chauvinism, authoritarianism, and racism) are presented as subversive by riding the wave of conspiracy theories. These people pose particular problems for anti-fascists, as it becomes necessary to rethink the struggle against the far right and take account of its ‘modernity’. Nevertheless, while Soral and Dieudonné (and their discourses) enjoy real popularity, including in milieus that might have seemed impervious to the far right, and despite its ubiquity on the Internet, this movement is struggling to equip itself with concrete political representation. The group set up to represent it, Egalité & Réconciliation (Equality & Reconciliation E & R) was founded by Alain Soral in 2007 to bring together right-wing nationalists and left-wing patriots, but after the failure of the anti-Zionist electoral list in 2009 the activists who had wanted to transform E & R into a political party left the group and Soral’s incoherence took care of the rest. Today, E & R is mainly a fan club for Soral and one of the main outlets for Dieudonné, who also possesses his own propaganda tools.

The Identitaires, having long dominated the radical far right (everything outside of the FN) thanks to their activism, failed to develop their strategy and operationalize small factions into a structured and mature movement. They gradually lost ground to new groups inspired by movements that had their heyday in the 1970s or 1980s, and this marked the return of a more traditional far right. This was the case with the Third Way, a movement led by Serge Ayoub (a Neo-Nazi skinhead leader in the 1980s), which was re-launched in 2010. Moreover, the far-right skinhead movement experienced a resurgence of activity in 2010. Although no central skinhead organisation existed that could unite the groups at the national level, several smaller groups became known for their political activism. However, since the dissolution of the Third Way in 2013, far right skinheads have scattered in the wind again.

The Third Way and the Identitaires were overtaken in 2011 by Jeunesses Nationalistes (JN – Nationalist Youth), the ‘youth’ branch of the Œuvre française led by Alexandre Gabriac. This movement was founded in 1968 and remained the oldest French nationalist movement until its dissolution in the summer of 2013. The JN used street activism to publicise their highly traditional nationalist positions that were very close to those of the nostalgics who pined for the Vichy era and French Algeria, but also of anti-Semites and Catholic extremists. This movement represented the ‘hard-line’ of the French far right. They wore uniforms and organised parades and tributes to historical fascist figures. Their unbridled activism
led to various trials and finally to their dissolution. Yet, it was not until 2014 that their leaders ran in municipal elections under their own name – clear proof that state-led anti-fascism is as inconsistent as it is ineffective.

As a consequence of the emergence of these movements, violent attacks by nationalists groups have proliferated in recent years, both against their ideological ‘targets’ (veiled women, homosexuals, etc.), as well as against anti-fascists. Despite a lack of clear political discourse, their growth (at least one new group crops up every year) is certainly worrying. How can the (relative) success of these movements in small towns and rural areas be explained? How can we organise anti-fascist defence and break the logic of fear on which these groups thrive?

To conclude this overview of the French far right, it is important to explain in more detail a faction that anti-fascists often overlook because of its discretion. Nationalist Catholics are highly influential due to their long-standing and consistent lobbying. Commonly referred to as Catholic fundamentalists, feminist activists have taken issue with these groups for many years as part of their campaign to defend the right to abortion. Dense and complex, the movement consists mainly of religious organisations, but also of political groups such as the Civitas Institute. This movement provides a framework for the activities of the most reactionary Catholics in politics. Its first protests were directed against cultural events and began working with radical groups of the far right such as le Renouveau Français – RF (French Renewal) and these activists did not even hesitate to destroy works of art with a hammer. Similarly, Civitas took a stand against plays declared as ‘blasphemous’, and claimed that it was fighting against Christianophobia or Cathophobia. The method used here is a classic one: they used the discourse of casual speech and turned it against other actors, just as AGRIF (General Alliance against Racism for the Respect of a French and Christian Identity) did with ‘anti-white racism’.

However it is the protest against ‘marriage for all’ that has recently demonstrated the importance of this movement. In 2012, the ‘Manif pour tous’ (Demonstration for All) movement was created to spread reactionary ideology supported by the Catholic right-wing. Mass protests were organised against the legalisation of same-sex marriage. This movement, born out of previous successive mobilisations against the Taubira Law on same-sex marriage (in addition to the PACS civil union contract in 1999), grabbed the headlines with its opposition to the bill from its presentation in October 2012 up until 2014, even though the law had been enacted in February 2013. Mass demonstrations were held in Paris every other month for about six months, and other actions took place in the rest of France. Many far right factions came together in support of these demonstrations, which gave the movement the possibility to show its true political colours. These included the newspaper Minute, as well as Civitas and RF but also Nationalist Youth and Oeuvre Française, (the leading exponents of the most racist and anti-Semitic propaganda). Neo-Nazis
collaborated with anti-feminists (the Antigones, the Caryatids) who had come to spread their ideas of complementarity instead of equality, which is completely in line with a reactionary movement that seeks retaliation for May 1968. Other minority groups such as Les Veilleurs (the Watchmen) or the Homen, a parody of Femen, also participated. It should be noted that the FN was absent during these actions and that Marine Le Pen remained silent about the protests. Nonetheless, some members, activists and elected officials from the FN took part in the demonstrations, including Marion Maréchal-Le Pen and Gilbert Collard. There are two main reasons for the low turnout among the FN. First, many senior National-Catholic members had left the FN with the arrival of Marine Le Pen as president; and second, Le Pen did not want to offend the gay electorate. Importantly, Jean-François Copé (UMP) was present at the demonstrations, as was Christine Boutin, who represented the Catholic right. Boutin founded a new party Force Vie (Life Force) for the European elections, and had hoped to build on the ‘Demonstration for All’ movement, but to no avail.

It is difficult to say whether this is an epiphenomenon or whether the ‘Demonstration for All’ movement has a political future. The movement remains centred on defending the traditional family and against ‘gender theory’, despite a split in March 2013 that led it to lose its most radical elements to Printemps français (French Spring), led by Beatrice Bourges. Whatever happens, ‘Demonstration for All’ represents a real reactionary turning point in France. The movement is characterised by hostility toward sexual minorities and a desire to assert a ‘natural’ order. For this vast nationalist Catholic movement, this order is not limited to the family. The movement also promotes French culture as Catholic, and as standing against what its members view as the ‘culture of death’; this not only refers to abortion or family planning, but also to assisting patients who are nearing the end of their lives.
Anti-modernists in search of modernity

Kerstin Köditz, Volkmar Wölk

Notes on the extreme right in Germany

The history of the German extreme right after 1945 is characterised by failure; the history of the German extreme right after the National Socialist era is a success story. Extreme right-wing political parties have only overcome the electoral threshold of 5% at the national level twice. Even extreme right-wing parties that have seen relative electoral success either quickly lost their representation in parliament or their gains were limited to specific regions. Similarly, the regions in which they have received high levels of support have changed as often as these parties’ ideologies.

Shortly after 1945, most fascist era activists were re-integrated into the everyday and professional life of post-war Germany. A deep process of re-nazification even set in during the time in which the Allied occupying powers exercised sovereignty over Germany. The Nazi’s system of morals and values as well as essential components of Nazi ideology remained largely in place in the zones occupied by the Western powers. It even became possible for people who had tarnished their reputations during National Socialism to be re-integrated as long as they formally supported democracy, accepted ties with the West and the importance of anti-communism, and refrained from making strong anti-Semitic remarks in public.

In the period that followed, the discourse between the conservative and liberal right and the extreme right constantly alternated between competition and cooperation. Nonetheless, competition in one region need not suggest that a more or less pronounced form of cooperation did not exist in other regions. Such cooperation could be based on broad sections of shared ideology, but at other times be limited to specific aspects of ideology. Similarly, whereas cooperation occurred between some extreme right-wing parties, cooperation with other parties was strictly avoided. However, this flexible form of cooperation was impossible with parties openly supportive of the former National Socialist regime. The conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) governments up to the early 1960s were always coalitions formed with parties whose members and leadership had been involved with the National Socialist regime. The CDU cooperated with the German Party, an extremely nationalistic, authoritarian state-based, monarchist-oriented group, as well as the ‘block of expellees and disenfranchised’ – which provided a focus for people who had been resettled from Germany’s former territories in the east – as well as the large number of people who had suffered professional and financial disadvantages as a result of the Allied policy of de-nazification. However, it was the
liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), which still exists today, that had the highest
terms of former Nazi cadres among its membership. Despite the cooperation,
the CDU did not hesitate to grasp the opportunity to significantly weaken its former
partners. Since this period, no rival party has been able to establish itself on the
right of the CDU without facing marginalisation for the reasons set out above.

1964 was marked by the foundation of the National Democratic Party (NPD); an
extreme right-wing party with the longest history of being marginalised out of
national interests. The NPD was founded after a prolonged phase of the failure of
the extreme right as a collective movement and developed out of an alliance
dominated by the Nazi German Reich Party (DRP), together with remnants of the
CDU’s former coalition partners, officials from the revanchist expellee associations
and some of the few right-wing intellectuals. This led the NPD to rapidly increase its
membership to 28,000, and win representation in seven regional parliaments. In the
run-up to the 1969 election, most people had assumed that the NPD would win
seats in the Bundestag, but the party marginally failed to do so with just 4.3% of the
vote. This milestone marked the beginning of the decline of the NPD; a process that
occurred almost as rapidly as the party’s ascent.

The NPD’s momentous defeat was only partially due to the party itself. During the
election, the NPD had included an appeal to revanchist nationalism directed against
the recognition of the post-war borders (‘renouncing [territories] is betrayal’) as an
essential aspect of its election manifesto. Just two years previously, this view had
been an irrefutable component of state doctrine; but the state’s position on this
issue had softened markedly since the publication of the Protestant Church’s
Ostedenkschrift. A new Ostpolitik, aimed at producing gradual change through
rapprochement instead of confrontation with the East – a policy that reflected the
contemporary political situation on the ground – had begun to replace the
revisionism which had been propagated by the state until that time. This policy was
upheld by the new coalition consisting of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the
FDP. Although the NPD managed to ensure that the ‘national question’ remained a
very important issue during the election campaign, and there were only marginal
differences between its approach and that of the CDU, right-wing voters believed
the CDU provided the better chance of successfully implementing the nationalist
stance.

During the 1969 elections one of the NPD’s main campaign issues was the
perceived importance of a need for more ‘law and order’. The revolt by parts of the
younger generation was at its highpoint during this time, and so the NPD’s
approach implied a policy of repression against the young rebels, and especially
those in the universities. Since the young demonstrators viewed anti-fascism and a
comprehensive reappraisal of Germany’s National Socialist past as essential
components of their ideology, they repeatedly organised massive demonstrations
against the NPD throughout the entire country, and these often resulted in militant
confrontations. These demonstrations resulted in the paradoxical image of a party (the NPD) demanding more 'law and order', but whose public appearances usually ended in disorder and chaos.

The NPD’s electoral defeat in 1969 and the conflict that this sparked within the party led the NPD to question its previous position as a more radical and consistent wing of conservatism. This debate resulted in a new approach that fundamentally opposed the ruling system. In turn, this caused the party to face further losses of support, and this situation still shapes extreme right-wing German politics. The NPD’s realignment caused the right-wing camp to split into different currents, and no right-wing party has been able to dominate this part of the political spectrum since. In fact, it took more than 30 years before the NPD was even able to regain parliamentary representation at the regional level.

The split within the extreme right that occurred at this time led many right-wing supporters and activists to return to party-like conservatism, and some even withdrew from politics completely. The German People’s Union (DVU) developed out of the divisions characterising this period, but it consisted more of a traditional association of former NSDAP members and old militarists than a political party; more than anything, it represented a loose reading circle based of the weekly newspaper National Zeitung. In contrast, younger activists developed ideological and cultural approaches that were closely based on those of the historical SA and this formed the next division within the extreme right. Although this grouping was smaller, it gradually gained support among its target group. Finally, a third group within the extreme right consisted largely of younger cadres, mainly intellectuals who sought to promote the ideological and cultural revival of the extreme right, usually with a newspaper project as their focus. This process left the NPD with just a few thousand members: the vast majority of whom were male, over 40 years of age, and belonged to the old middle-class.

The extreme right continued to play an utterly insignificant role in German politics until the 1980s. The initial impetus for the change in its extremely miserable condition was provided by the foundation of the Republican Party (REP) in 1983. The REP had developed out of a right-wing split with the conservative Christian Social Union (CSU). Its leadership consisted of two former CSU members of the Bundestag; and Franz Schönhuber, the well-known television journalist and former member of the Waffen-SS. After moderate successes in the 1986 Bavarian election, the REP continued to expand rapidly and this also led to changes in the new party’s ideological orientation. Although supporters were joining from the conservative camp, the lion’s share of the REP’s new support actually came from the extreme right, and the party seemed to have swallowed up large numbers of right-wingers who had refrained from joining other parties because they had lacked any chance of success. The peak of the REP’s success occurred in January 1989 when the party gained representation in Berlin’s regional parliament. In June 1989, the REP also
gained representation in the European Parliament; the first time in the history of the Federal Republic that an extreme right-wing party had overcome the 5% threshold at the national level. Moreover, its success in Baden-Württemberg’s regional election later in the year provided the REP with the strongest ever election results of an extreme right-wing party in the history of the Federal Republic until that point.

The success of the extreme right-wing in these elections clearly demonstrated flaws in (among others, left-wing) understandings of right-wing ideology and voting patterns, which were unable to account for certain important factors and developments. In particular, the REP’s gains in Baden-Württemberg demonstrated that the assertion that social decline, unemployment and poverty were essential for right-wing electoral success was misleading: the REP’s stronghold of Baden-Württemberg was the German state with the lowest level of unemployment and the highest average household income. During the elections, the extreme right had linked its discourse on the immigration of asylum seekers to a perceived risk of social decline for people already living in Germany. However, this typical nationalist discursive bundle was less effective among people whose lives were directly affected by social decline than among those who lived in secure circumstances, but whether justified or not, feared impending social decline. As such, the REP’s best election results in the European Parliamentary elections occurred in the constituencies with the highest density of millionaires and the highest levels of prosperity in Germany.

A large difference between the REP and the NPD was that during its early history, the REP had successfully modernized its anti-modern membership. The REP had learned from the negative experiences made by the NPD, and carefully avoided obvious ideological links to National Socialism and people who had been active in Nazi groups. However, this process remained necessarily inconsistent as the REP still had to appeal to its extreme right-wing target group. Subsequently, the party underscored the party chair’s (Franz Schönhuber) former membership of the Waffen-SS. The aim was to demonstrate that the SS – as part of the Wehrmacht – had fought bravely and decently and that its members – such as Schönhuber – had provided important contributions to Germany’s re-emergence after the Second World War. The rapid growth in the REP’s personnel meant that it was inevitable that many cadres from the extreme right – including those from militant neo-Nazi local groups – would join the party. Schönhuber commented on this by stating that “respectability comes with success” and party propaganda consequently focused far less on social issues.

Whereas at first the REP’s open racism had appealed to ‘normal people’s interests’, the party began moving towards policies based on welfare chauvinism. This was accompanied by the REP’s replacement of völkisch racism, which continued to characterise the NPD, with a culturally and/or religiously-based form of racism as part of its process of modernization. The REP’s supporters had assumed that the
newly-formed CDU government would immediately reverse the détente with the East; this policy, however, continued virtually unchanged. As nothing came of Helmut Kohl’s promised ‘spiritual and moral turn’ – the reversal of the dramatic changes to the German moral system that had occurred with the advent of the 1968 rebellion – the extreme right was able to profit from right-wing dissatisfaction with hegemonic conservatism.

The end of ‘real existing socialism’ between 1989 and 1992 brought the modernization of the extreme right to a radical halt. This was followed by a period in which extreme right-wing structures experienced rapid decline. However, younger, more militant activists whose views were based on National Socialism benefitted most from this process. These activists were led by cadres from the West, and in parts of eastern Germany they developed into a movement that took on an almost hegemonic position outside of the larger cities; a position they often maintained with terror. The support these groups found among broad sections of society led them to assume they represented the will of the majority. The reaction of the government and the opposition SPD to the racist pogroms of Rostock-Lichtenhagen and Hoyerswerda – the virtual abolition of the fundamental right to asylum – further encouraged these racist groups. As the promised ‘flourishing landscapes’ in eastern Germany had never materialised, the unprecedented levels of social decline in the region left many people feeling as if they had been betrayed twice. The alternative that was presented to them was neither based on socialism (East Germany) or capitalism (the Federal Republic), but on the national community formed through National Socialism. However, the rise of this movement and popular racism had little effect at the elections, as the extreme right at this time largely consisted of a cultural and political movement with highly fragmented representative organisations.

This situation continued until state repression in the early 1990s led some of the most important fascist organisations to be proscribed in rapid succession. This policy was unable to effectively suppress these groups; and it remained contradictory as no other attempts were made by the government to counter the rise of the extreme right. This led the right-wing to regroup, and support finally moved back to the otherwise insignificant NPD, and the party was slowly able to regain its hegemonic position within the extreme right. Under the new party chair, Udo Voigt, and the head of the party’s youth wing, Holger Apfel, who later went on to become chair of the party, the NPD acted as a catchall for broad sections of the extreme right. The party organ Deutsche Stimme relocated to Saxony in 2000, and many leading cadres followed suit. This combined with the social upheaval that was on-going at the time – which had been caused by the government and the bourgeois opposition – to provide the NPD with its first parliamentary breakthrough in 32 years.
In 2004, the NPD won seats in the regional parliament in Saxony, and gained almost 10 per cent of the vote. In half of the region’s constituencies, the NPD outperformed the SPD. In fact, there were more NPD members in Saxony than members of the Green Party or FDP. Electoral gains in this region were followed by successes in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, and this situation was repeated in both states five years later. The success of the NPD was built on its ability to tap into a close-knit network of de facto front organisations in these regions that focused on cultural issues. Since state youth work had been largely dismantled, these structures, which were oriented towards National Socialism, often provided the only alternative. However, despite the support among this milieu for the NPD, it was also unhappy with the party which it viewed as having not fought energetically enough against the system. Instead, the NPD was accused of adhering to parliamentarianism. Although this criticism was associated with a weakening of the NPD, it did not weaken this milieu, which sympathised with the party but commonly accepted terror as a normal method of politics – and continues to do so.

The NPD may soon lose its parliamentary bastions; a situation that has become more likely due to renewed attempts to proscribe the party. However, many former NPD supporters are switching to the smaller and even more radical parties that are currently being founded. In addition to a decline in membership, the NPD currently faces significant internal conflicts and serious financial problems. The unmasking of the neo-Nazi terror network National Socialist Underground (NSU) has made it even more difficult for so-called ‘respectable’ people to openly identify with the extreme right, because the NSU terrorists are – correctly – considered as connected to the NPD by political commentators.

One such party that is now directly competing with the NPD is Alternative for Germany (AfD), which was founded in 2012. The AfD has already become well-known for its public appearances with representatives of the social elite. The new party fell short of the electoral threshold in the Bundestag elections in 2013, but gained just over seven per cent of the votes and seven seats in the 2014 European Parliamentary elections. The AfD is predicted as having good chances of gaining representation in two regional parliaments in the elections that are due to take place in three eastern German states in late summer. Although the AfD has only existed for two years, it has already gained almost 20,000 members, but this growth has reduced significantly in recent months. Similarly, despite the fact that the focus of AfD support is found in eastern Germany (Saxony and Brandenburg), recent election results demonstrate that the AfD has considerable potential for electoral success in wealthy states such as Hessen and Baden-Württemberg. Although empirical studies are still needed, a plausible working hypothesis might predict that the AfD appeals to different target groups in different regions with different issues.

Although the future ideological development of the AfD is unclear, the current situation suggests that its neoliberal core, which has formed a strong part of the
party since its beginning, will be progressively displaced and replaced by politicians from the right of the CDU or from failed smaller parties belonging to the spectrum located between the CDU and the NPD. The AfD’s official bodies are dominated by freelancers, small business owners and officials (police officers), and its cadres have above average levels of education. In fact, the party’s high percentage of university graduates, especially from the field of economics, led the AfD to successfully present itself as the ‘Party of Professors’. The party’s policies are still quite rudimentary and largely confined to election manifestos. However, the party has recently supplemented its criticism of the EU with a vehement criticism of Islam and immigration, combined with Christian fundamentalism and associated policies such as opposition to ‘gender ideology’ and homosexuality.

In the past, multiple attempts have been made to establish a neo-liberal and anti-democratic party such as the AfD. Until now, these attempts have been unsuccessful. Although the AfD has faced continual setbacks due to conflicts over personnel and on its key issues, the point has possibly been reached in which success breeds success. The party’s political competition is currently unsure about the correct path of action to take against the AfD, and some parties are even facing internal conflict over this issue. This, of course, additionally improves the chances of this party. The current situation suggests that it is this type of party that is most likely to present the main medium-term danger from the right in Europe.
The far right in North Europe

Anne Jessen

Denmark
European Union

In the 2014 European Parliament elections, the right-wing populist Danish people’s party Dansk Folkeparti (DF), founded in 1995, garnered 26.6 per cent of the vote and gained four seats, doubling their 2009 results. They are now Denmark’s largest party.

Although DF is highly EU-sceptical, it participates in EP elections to represent Danish national interests in Brussels. According to DF, nation states alone can ensure the influence of national populations. Moreover, within the EU, DF works hard to prevent Turkish EU membership, since Turkey’s ‘Eastern’ culture and Europe’s ‘Western’ culture are, in their eyes, incompatible.

At the EU level, DF pursues the goal of ‘liberty and freedom’ for Europe. Before the 2014 elections, the party joined forces with other nationalists in “Europe of Freedom and Democracy”, an EP group founded shortly after the June 2009 elections.

After the 2014 elections however, DF became part of David Cameron’s group, “European Conservatives and Reformists”. DF was not attracted by Wilders’ and Le Pen’s attempts to found a new right-wing nationalist group in the EU parliament. The party was surprised to see Wilders collaborate with the Front National, saying that “FN’s anti-Semitism is too extreme”. This statement is rather hypocritical, considering that DF has maintained regular contact with Wilders for many years. The anti-Islamic Free Press Society (Trykkefrihedsselskabet), which is close to the DF, has invited Wilders to Copenhagen as a guest speaker several times. Wilders too has frequently emphasized that DF has been his political role model.

Nationalism and anti-Islamism

In its party programme DF states that “Denmark belongs to the Danes”. “The country is founded on the Danish cultural heritage”. “This culture consists of the sum of the Danish people's history, experience, beliefs, language and customs.” This excludes people from other cultural backgrounds: “Denmark is not an immigrant-country and never has been. Thus we will not accept transformation to a multi-ethnic society.”

Such statements could also stem from groups right of DF. However, DF has always taken great care to strategically distance itself from these groups. In 1999 for example, DF excluded 19 members of its youth organisation on the grounds that they held extremist right-wing positions.

Yet it is easy to see through these attempts at obfuscation to the party’s nationalist and anti-Muslim – basically racist – core. In 1998, these fundamental DF positions
led Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen to proclaim in the Danish parliament Folketing: “You'll never be house-trained”. At the time, he felt that collaboration with DF was completely out of the question.

Political influence
Three years later, in 2001, the social democratic government stepped down and a liberal-conservative government was sworn in. This government stayed in power for the following ten years. In the 2005 elections, DF bolstered its 2001 success. Winning 13.3 per cent of the vote, the party increased its number of seats from 22 to 24, only to lose 2 seats again in the 2011 elections. During the ten years of conservative rule, DF has, as one of the largest parliamentary parties, put its stamp on immigration policy. Danish immigration legislation is now among the strictest in the EU. DF was at the forefront of the 2006 cartoon crisis. The anti-Muslim rhetoric DF politicians spouted from the parliamentary lectern was unprecedented in Danish politics at the time, but was nonetheless broadly accepted, even by mainstream society.

DF has modernised and is now attempting to rid itself of its radical right-wing image and instead present itself as socially minded. Through this populist approach, the party posits itself as defending the interests of “ordinary people” against the established and elitist political system.

Conservative parties and even some social democratic politicians are willing to work together with DF, mainly, because DF has many voters — a fact that became evident in the 2014 EP elections. In autumn 2015 at the latest, Denmark will hold parliamentary elections. Then it shall be seen whether the electorate is still willing to give DF its vote.

Other right-wing extremist groups
There are other nationalist/populist groups, albeit lacking political influence:
National Socialist Movement of Denmark
The Party of Danes (Danskernes Parti)
The Danish National Front
Stop Islamisation of Denmark

Sweden
European Union
During the 2014 EP elections, the nationalist and populist right-wing party Sverigedemokraterne (SD) gained 9.7 per cent of the vote and two seats. It is the first time the party has entered the EU parliament. The party became part of the group Europe of Freedom and Democracy, led by UKIP member Nigel Farage.

SD policy
SD, founded in 1988, describes itself as a “social-conservative party with a nationalist fundament that is proud of its conservative, cultural values”. The party also considers itself central to what the extreme right in Sweden has begun to call “the Swede-friendly movement”. SD is an EU-sceptical party that would like to see Sweden leave the union. The central aim of its EU platform is the return of competencies from Brussels to Stockholm. Based on its nationalist values, SD’s minimum demand is that Sweden quit the Schengen agreement and limit the free movement of persons within the EU.

The role of SD
For many years, SD had a very marginal position in Sweden and had no influence in the policies of the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament. Since SD entered the Riksdag in 2010, the traditional Swedish parties have actively avoided collaboration with the party. In 2010 for example, when the government was formed, conservative Prime Minister Frederik Reinfeldt completely ignored SD. Nonetheless, these attempts to blunt the influence of SD have apparently not affected voters, as EP elections show. SD gained 5.7 per cent of the vote in the 2010 Swedish elections and 20 out of a total of 349 seats. This increase in voter support was sustained after the party was elected into the Riksdag. By the end of 2013, party membership had – according to the party itself – gone up by 51 per cent compared to the previous year to a total of 11,876 members. That is the highest number of members since the party was founded.

Internet warriors at the forefront
The SD may as yet have no real influence in the political arena, but the party’s rising popularity among the population cannot be ignored. This is part of a general shift to the right in public opinion and political life. Not only SD demands stricter immigration legislation in Sweden. The country’s conservative government has also generally shifted policy to become more critical of immigration.

Since SD entered the Riksdag, there have been recurrent debates surrounding SD’s participation in the xenophobic hate website “Avpixlat”. This website aims to depixelate the pictures of criminal suspects and publish them in the Swedish press – something not done in Sweden for ethical reasons. Avpixlat has grown in past years and now has real influence on public debate. In December 2013, the research group Avkodat (avkodat.research.nu) and the Swedish daily newspaper Expressen, published an analysis of the people who wrote comments on STV-Debat, the online forum of Sweden’s national television broadcaster. The analysis showed that 50 per cent of contributions to STV-Debat overall and 90 per cent of contributions about immigration and integration issues were from people who also posted on Avpixlat. These numbers are interesting, because Avpixlat contributors often hold the same opinions as SD members. Most likely they therefore also identify with SD positions. Public debate in Sweden is thus dominated by a minority that is using the internet
strategically and effectively to sway public opinion. It does this not only on its own website, but also on Sweden’s largest website for public debate. As a party, SD is highly critical of immigration. Its positions are founded on an ethno-pluralist doctrine which brings it close to more extremist right-wing groups in Sweden. Proposals made by the party in the Riksdag demonstrate a focus on issues such as integration, migration and refugees. An investigation by the Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet revealed that one third of all proposals made by the party in the Riksdag were related to immigration – across all policy fields. The party’s agenda is therefore clear: It wants less immigrants and refugees in Sweden and wishes to curtail the rights of those refugees and immigrants already living in Sweden. Moreover, the party advocates a conservative vision for society. This is illustrated for example by the party’s support for the national Church of Sweden which it wishes to award a more prominent role in Swedish society. In this way, SD contributes to the re-politicisation of the church. The next parliamentary elections will be held in September 2014.

Other right-wing extremist groups
These groups are without political influence, but extremely violent against immigrants and people they consider left wing:
The Party of the Swedes (Svenskarnas Parti)
The Swedish Resistance Movement (Svenska Motståndsrörelsen)
The National Democrats (Nationaldemokraterna)

Finland
European Union
Finns Party, founded in 1995, won 12.9 per cent of the vote and two seats in the 2014 EP elections, doubling its share since the previous elections. Finns Party is part of David Cameron’s European Conservatives and Reformists group. In the previous election period it collaborated with the Danish People’s Party in the Europe for Freedom and Democracy group.

Policies of Finns Party
In the 2011 Finnish parliamentary elections, Finns Party increased its number of seats by 34 to 39 and became the third largest party in Finland. Nonetheless, the party has no influence in the Finnish parliament. Finns Party is a populist, highly EU-sceptical party and as such also opposes financial aid to crisis-ridden southern European countries. So far, however, the party has not demanded Finland become the only northern European country to exit the euro area. Neither does the party want Finland to leave the EU. This position is politically rather than economically motivated. Finns share a distinct fear of their eastern neighbour Russia. In this area, Finns Party is driven by security interests and the wish to be part of a larger entity and cement Finland’s European identity.
However Finns Party is against NATO membership. They work towards a strict immigration policy and aim to end the teaching of Swedish in Finnish schools. The party is pronouncedly anti-Islamic.

*Internet activists*
Many Finns Party members are bloggers and actively participate in right-wing extremist sites such as Hommaforum. The discussion whether to found Finns Party or whether potential members should rather join existing parties was to a certain degree held on this site. The right-wing extremist organisation Suomen Sisu is also very active on Hommaforum. Suomen Sisu was founded at the end of the 1990s in Helsinki as the youth organisation of the Association for Finnish Identity and Culture. In 2000, all cooperation ended abruptly when the media began writing about Suomen Sisu’s neo-fascist connections. Suomen Sisu combines an islamophobic ideology with the wish to protect the Finnish culture and language. In 2011, the organisation counted 700 members. One-third of the 40 Finns Party Members of Parliament are connected to both Hommaforum and Suomen Sisu. These representatives have actively driven the radicalisation of the party’s immigration policy and have not been ousted from the party to date.

*Norway*
Norway is not an EU member state.

Since the 2013 Norwegian parliamentary elections, the populist and right-wing Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet), founded in 1973, has been part of the conservative coalition government led by Erna Solberg. The terrorist Anders Behring Breivik was a member of Fremskrittspartiet for ten years. This makes it all the more surprising that in democratic, rich and social-liberalist Norway such a party could become part of a coalition government. Fremskrittspartiet claims that Breivik was a passive member and that he left the party because it did not support his political views. Nonetheless, Fremskrittspartiet is largely responsible for the atmosphere of impending disaster in discourse on Norwegian immigration and refugee policies, a debate that identifies refugees, the “politically correct” and social democrats as the enemy.

*Meagre election results*
Having lost 6.6 per cent in the last elections, Fremskrittspartiet achieved only meagre results. But because the conservative party Høyre did well in the elections – gaining 9.6 per cent – a right-wing and conservative (“blue-black”) government coalition became possible that replaced the governing social democrat and centre party (“red-green”) coalition.

*The opportunists*
Several policy statements made in the government’s coalition paper caused a great stir. Most contentious have been the plans to build secure units for rejected asylum seekers, to arm the as yet unarmed Norwegian police, to institute workfare for recipients of government benefits and to privatise public services. According to the constitution of Norway and international law, it is illegal to imprison people without a sentence. This makes it doubtful whether the blue-black government will obtain a parliamentary majority to introduce secure institutions for all those whose asylum applications are rejected. But even a compromise on this issue would tighten refugee and immigrant-related policies. The liberal Venstre party and the Christian Folkepartei – both opportunistically supportive of the government – nonetheless stand for a more liberal policy towards refugees. Merely the fact that, for the first time, Fremskrittspartiet was considered a possible government coalition partner signals a dangerous development. Resistance against foreigners and in particular Muslims is such an integral part of Fremskrittspartiet’s image, the party no longer needs to even mention these questions in its election campaigns.

*Two-track communication*

Fremskrittspartiet has consciously pursued a two-track communication strategy. The former leadership has continued with its classical, brutish campaign style, while the party leader, Siv Jensen, and the “new” leadership have presented themselves as responsible and moderate. Without doubt, this two-track communication policy has had a positive effect, although it also led to tensions within the party. These tensions could easily develop into real trouble, in particular if acting “responsibly” does not yield results in key Fremskrittspartiet policy fields.

The alliance between conservatives and Fremskrittspartiet’s authoritarian populism is worrying.

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The Danish, Swedish, Finnish and Norwegian Defence League are internationally active in the anti-Islamic Defence League network. National socialist groups from Denmark, Sweden and Finland have founded a network, The Nordic Resistance Movement, with the goal of a free and unified north.
The Extreme Right and the Crisis in Slovenia

Lara Otonicar

Introduction.

This paper places Slovenian phenomena of right extremism in the wider European and regional context and it thus needs to be understood as such. However, the main aim is to present the particulars and in consequence draw parallels with the universals. Informative value of the present paper thus prevails above the contextual one, while it urges a wider perspective on the matter.

There are two aspects of the right extremism: the organized forms and the popular opinion, yet without active participation. The latter enables and legitimizes the former, however it does not directly participate in it. Nonetheless, sympathy for the former becomes evident in the political spectrum.

On the other hand, right extremism has, since the onset of the crisis, reaffirmed its power and has been so present and inter-connected locally, regionally and internationally, that it is difficult to speak about strictly isolated phenomena. This paper then stipulates a contextual approach to the topic, keeping in mind multiple layers and mechanisms simultaneously, by focusing on the Slovenian case, its recent past, and linking it to the conditions as emerged through the neoliberal crisis.

Extremism in Slovenia.

Recently, new forms of social exclusion and segregation have emerged in Europe, and established themselves firmly, with a more or less latent approach. Some of them bear reactionary continuity and familiarity with their historical predecessors, whereas others emanate with regards to new contexts and circumstances, and legitimize themselves historically in retrospect. They draw on mythology where necessary or invent it accordingly.

The Slovenian Intelligence and Security Agency (SOVA) published a well awaited report on the extremist groups in Slovenia in the fall of 2012. The report has been problematic since the public and professionals became aware of it, for multiple reasons. Firstly, it was very brief, just over 3 typed pages in length. This was peculiar, since it was already a second draft. The first draft was finished about 6 months earlier, however it has been blocked by the government led by the right-wing party SDS (more below). In retrospect the difference between the two drafts was quite striking; whereas the second one omitted next to all relevant information regarding the extreme right, the original one contained it, for example organizational

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1 Apparently, previous (center-left) government led by Social Democrats (SD) had previously gathered a vast amount of sources, and so even the first known draft has been quite censored and lacked major stacks of information.
and territorial structure, affiliation with other organizations etc. Methodologically, the report aimed at determining the level of danger to the public safety based on different classification of extremism; it taxonomized the groups as follows: left extremism, islamic extremism, and right extremism. It then issued a brief account on their activities, yet it lacked thorough definitions on any of these groups.

For the first two groups, the report was much more eloquent than on the third one, which is what has been one of the main reproaches to the report. More specifically, it observed that the first two groups may exist, and to some extent hold international connections with other similar groups, yet bear virtually no danger to the public. With the third category – the right extremist groups – the report was much skimpier. A highly censured version that leaked to public revealed that there was virtually no sign of right extremism in Slovenia, at least no dangerous one, which directly juxtaposed the reality.

For instance, the report went as far back as the Slovenia Summit 2001 (the meeting of president Bush and president Putin), when there has been a peaceful protest in the center of Ljubljana. A group of people that opposed globalization, imperialism, US and Russian environmental policies and democratic deficit, walked the streets, without any incidents, yet this bit of information made it into the report. On the other hand, serious security breaches and violent outbreaks, as well as other visible public gatherings of the right extremist groups were vastly overlooked, including the recent ones between 2008 and 2012.

Obviously, there is a difference between the well organized, militant groups of extremists and their veiled sympathizers, however due to the non-existent legislation on the extremism in Slovenia, the former are well exposed and certainly present without having to operate in secrecy. What links them is usually their mutual inclination to racism, xenophobia, homophobia, superiority of their own people (in which ever the context) and / or nation, etc. While hate speech and any agitation with regards to hatred is forbidden, separate interest groups are allowed and are in fact not under any surveillance.

**Crises and Uprisings.**

What allies these (neo)fascist groups of the present and the past based on historical experience seems to follow under three categories, all heavily relying on the socio-political context in which they emerge (though not necessarily chronologically): crisis of capitalism and accompanying social catastrophe, anti-intellectual social environment which escalates into despising everything (vaguely) intellectual as well as public services – not only Jewish bankers, also academics, nurses and clerks are seen as the parasites and the culprits of the social issues, and lastly, relative weakness and paralysis of the left.

The critique of the system becomes the concrete critique of the national and / or racial character, or alternatively, racism and strong aversion to the social state join into a ruthless media bashing as was the example in Greece.

Ideologically, the problem of capitalism as a system is imposed onto the problem of a ‘culture’ and national character: the people are too lazy, work too little, rely on others and the state too much, and are generally in dire need of a new value
system. Fascism reveals itself not only as violence aimed at migrants and minorities on the streets, but it also manifests itself as a form of anti-intellectual quasi-debates on the crises of values and the need for national re-definition among the rational people.

Historical fascism was only able to grasp the crowds after the failed revolutions. After the social situation had become unbearable (the Great Depression and the Great War) and the left had not succeeded, fascism usurped rhetorics and praxis of the leftist anti-capitalist movements and offered superficially idyllic national community instead; the one where fraternity of the race could supposedly abolish all the social antagonisms, yet without abolishing the manipulative social relations that cause them.

The key motto of fascist ideology is resistance to un-productivity in all its forms: When there is no incentive to overcome individual’s dependence on selling labor on the free market, the cult of fair labor and hatred towards the lazy and the parasites can emerge.

Historical fascisms intended to rescue capitalism against its depressions and against the revolutionary tendencies, by eliminating democracy and getting rid of the ‘excess’ population by exterminating it. In the EU today, democracy is quite limited with a large part of political entitlements transferred from the democratic to the non-democratic bodies, or to the institutions independent from democratic processes (EC and ECB).

The methods of controlling the crises are much more advanced and sophisticated today than they were in the 1930’s. Social and fiscal policies of EU member states are greatly dependent and not sovereign at all. In order to enforce austerity measures, shrinking of social rights, strict as well as restricting, selective, and exclusive social policy, the member states no longer need to refer to drastic measures and instill dictatorships. Preserving formal democracy and legal state whilst practicing social havoc are no longer mutually excluding premises.

Regarding the ‘excess’ population, the methods have also changed. Literal destruction of the aliens is being systematically replaced with police control and management of migration flows and urban segregation of those who manage to get or stay into the ‘promised lands’: the poor, socially excluded economically surplussed (due to the increased precariousness of labor markets). Radical measures are moved towards the edge or outside the EU where the territories and institutions (centers for foreigners) are set up, so as to avoid the general law and where the migrants are exposed to direct police and military violence.

In such an atmosphere the Slovenian Uprisings of the Winter of 2012-13 had taken place. People went on the streets, adopted similar measures as have previously been exercised in Syntagma Square, and publicly revolted against the neoliberal usurpation of their own public, political and social space, with corresponding values that they did care about and the rights they have already fought for in the past. Tens of thousands of people have gone out on the streets and square in that cold winter. Art and politics were exercised via the means of direct democracy, and they want out with everything old, corrupted, and austerity-laden. They protested against
increasing intolerance, hate speech, human and social rights violation, police repression and constant verbal (as well as physical) attacks by the (rightist) politicians.

The core difference between the classical fascism and present institutionalized racism is in the fact that the latter no longer requires a clearly defined concept of race, as it instead functions as a bundle of intertwined technologies, social exclusion, segregation, mass deportation and limiting of the access to the political and social rights without the explicit language and practices of (superior / inferior) race ideology, yet it is not entirely invisible. If people are underestimated (which they were by large, due to long years of relative political apathy), the 'street happens' as has often been uttered in Slovenia during the Uprisings in all major towns and cities. Except from a few lonely perpetrators, the Uprisings have been very peaceful, with families and elderly participating. The only serious violence occurred when the right extremists mingled among the masses and started rioting violently, with the help of weaponry and firecrackers.

A revealing example of institutionalized racism is the case of the 'Deleted' in Slovenia 22 years ago. Then, 25000 people were deleted from the state registry, effectively becoming foreigners. No government since has allowed for a step forward in solving this problem, no matter its position on the political spectrum, which also shows that it is not an anomaly, but rather an inherent component of the system. Even more, counter to the Constitutional Court, no formal apology was never issued and no responsibility was claimed, though it is clear who was in parliament at the time. Instead, some financial retribution was offered, in exchange for insisting on the discourse of them being foreigners (mainly from the countries of former Yugoslavia) and parasites.

This was one of the issues that has been given considerable amount of attention again during the Uprisings, joining all sorts of activism under the slogan: 'They are all finished!' or 'They are done', resonating the sentiment that there has not been much of an alternative offered in the past few years of representative democracy. The people felt massively un-represented and have had enough of abuses made 'as if' on their behalf.

**European context and neofascism.**

It must be noted that the current social and political processes are no milder, less problematic or less haunting than their historical examples; on the contrary, because of the absence of explicitly racist ideology and the combination of excluding migration and restrictive social policies, that are also casually being executed by the 'left' and liberal governments, it is more difficult to recognize their perilous outlook. The criticism that is often aimed at the racist escapades of the extreme right only, overlooks the underlying routine and system-wide institutionalized racism of the liberal center position.

At the same time, at the borders of the EU where its control over migration flows is most visibly violent and repressive, a phenomenon of neo-fascism is emerging. The Golden Dawn of Greece and the Hungarian Jobbik, to some extent also Bulgarian Ataka and Ukrainian Svoboda, are proper representatives of the racism of the
center. At the EU periphery where the recent crisis has left the consequences most uncovered, institutionalized racism blends quite remarkably with the fascist attributes, and state violence over migrants and minorities joins the paramilitary formations and street gangs. This shows us that the elements of fascism in either a more modern, technocratic form of official migration and social policies of EU, or in more palpable violent and racist form of extreme right at its periphery, always accompany capitalism as a fellow passenger, and take up a more radical approaches in its crises, hence implying that these extremes cannot be eliminated without eliminating capitalism first.

To return to the Slovenian case specifically, the Blood and Honour Slovenia is still one of the most visible extreme nationalist groups, together with the Headhunters. There are also interest groups that are strictly speaking not necessarily within the neofascist realm, but nonetheless operate on the field of extreme right, such as Here is Slovenia and Hervardi. In between these groups, there are also Slovene Radicals and Autonomous Nationalists. The members are well connected to the political playground as well: a few of them have had proven connections to the previously biggest Slovenian (right-wing) party – Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) and Slovenian National Party (SNS), they are infiltrated among the military and police staff, as well other institutions. Recently, a journalist who was researching the connections between the Blood and Honour and the SDS was criminally persecuted. But there are also less lucid, yet perfectly common means for establishing contact with potential members, particularly the younger ones: various NGOs are financed by political parties, and in turn, those instill certain values upon participants and members, so as to prepare them for the infiltration. Identity thus plays a major role here as well.

Obviously, there are also many other recruitment opportunities for (mainly but not exclusively) youth to come in touch with them: the sports clubs and supporters, such as Green Dragons of Ljubljana, appear to have as high as one quarter ratio of the neofascist members, which is worrisome, to say the least. According to some older members, such affiliation was condemned in the past, but is now becoming more and more accepted. One can imagine that this is also because the general sentiment of the country, as well as wider European context, has indeed become less reluctant and more tolerant to hate speech and other means of disseminating violence.

For many of the groups, connecting internationally is crucial. Lately, a new trend of neofascist turism has emerged: these groups are then freely networking, organizing conferences, concerts and other events in plain sight in Slovenia, as there are virtually no institutional or legal restrictions against radical interest groups and their (semi)public gatherings.

At times, these international gatherings are absurd: a rising amount of neofascist groups along Slovenian seaside shows that they use and identify themselves through the same symbols as their Italian counterparts – whereas historically, this is quite distasteful if not entirely inappropriate for a large amount of people who have experienced the tragedy of Italian fascism during the WWII in that region. Moreover, it is not clear, whether these groups are, internationally speaking, allies or in competition.
History is being reinvented to fit with the ideology of Slovene Home Guard (the modern history places them strictly opposite to the Partisans), which openly collaborated with the occupying forces, to the extent that the revolution following the WWII is being demonized as a separate event from national emancipation, rather than being seen as the same event, reached by the same means. Theories of totalitarianism are emerging and symbols of the historical fascism are openly resurrected, proclaiming collaborators as national heroes. At the same time, under the government of SDS, the proposition was filed so as to forbid any symbols of the socialist ideas, such as the red star. This double-faceted, hypocrisy filled populism, is yet another side to the method of rescuing the neoliberal order by the right parties and evoke emotional response among the population.

Obviously, not only the (extreme) right gets stronger in the crisis, also other groups, including the left, can step together in solidarity, as was the case in Slovenia during the 2012-13 uprisings. However, optimism we should not take for granted. Negative solidarity is also on the rise: 'If I have nothing, why should 'those people' have more than me? Let us cut their wages, too!'

On a general assessment, the situation is quite tense in Slovenia, though with other more prominent cases of Europe, such as France, the Netherlands and Ukraine, it seems minute. Obviously, this paper dedicated quite some focus to the systemic racism rather than to a few extremist groups, but with a clear agenda: to prevent the former to go unnoticed and to avoid redirecting the attention away from its sophisticated mechanisms. The former requires no archaic mythology and symbolism or mass mobilization – state controlled repression suffices.

The left-liberal position modestly insists on the position of stipulating more tolerance, more human rights and effective legal state, but at the same time fails to recognize the peaceful coexistence of the legal state and parliamentary democracy with the systematic liberal racism – though a more subtle one. They see the problem in the sports club supporters and suburban youth, rather than in the system, effectively discrediting left positions. Antifa can sometimes be problematic as well. If it poses itself ideologically on the liberal side it mystifies and conceals the class dimension of social struggles and prevents its politicization, by focusing on the country side anti-intellectual aspect, blaming lack of culture and civilization in a highly bourgeois spirit onto them. The labor-capital antagonism is then overruled with the urban-rural distinction, which is another symptom of potential class arrogance. The liberal Antifa then, unfortunately, can also turn out to be a politically correct version of class ignorance. The pragmatic level of affairs namely cannot go beyond its formal restrictions: it can ban fascist symbols, but it cannot eliminate the politics behind them, so it is merely a comforting strategy.

Political organization against fascism is urgent. Lately, but especially in the past 5 years when the capitalist crisis has pronounced economic conflicts between the center and the periphery, not only mass protests and uprisings have occurred, but also the rise of the extreme right. Analytically, the conceptions of fascism today are relatively weak; critical discourse often fails to identify fascist diversity in terms of methods. The tolerance developed now encompasses both, the liberal resilience as well as the social darwinism of neoliberal policies, but nonetheless also the more
'dogmatic' old-fascist street gang and subcultural groups, offending the migrants, Roma, homeless, and all who are different from them.

**Conclusion.**

In Slovenia, the organized groups usually adhere to a more subcultural characteristics, while the political parties of the right tend to openly shift to some extreme right demands, the latter in line with the rest of the EU. What is particular, on the other hand, is that the right in Slovenia is also straightforwardly trying to criminalize any left opinion, in reality paradoxically to their own position equating left and right extremism. National-socialism is being replaced with the as if ready-made national-liberalism.

Whereas the left seems to be resurrecting all over Europe, there is hope that the structural relationships between the center and the periphery will again find their place in the critical discourse of today, together with the uncompromising anti-fascist revival. Only with a 'big picture' approach and with the methodologically rigid analysis can the extreme right be recognized for what it is – extremely dangerous – and be penalized accordingly. Mostly, it can no longer parade under the mask of liberal status quo if also the latter is critically assessed, questioned, and resurrected out of its own ignorance.
The rise of the far right in Hungary

Mathyas Benyik

The Athena Institute has been identifying 8 major active extremist groups in Hungary and monitoring their actions for more than 4 years. These groups are as follows: the New Hungarian Guard, the Hungarian National Guard, the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, the Outlaws' Army, the For a Better Future Self Defence, the Guards of the Carpathian Homeland, the kuruc.info and the Hungarian National Front. The extremist groups and the Jobbik party (The Movement for a Better Hungary) played an important role in the revival and success of the Hungarian far-right scene. They mutually strengthened and used each other to reach their political goals.

From 2007 until around 2011 the popularity, the number of members and influence of the so-called „radical nationalist” groups close to Jobbik grew steadily, despite the banning of the original Hungarian Guard. These extremist outfits built a virulent subculture and a stable hinterland for the political far-right, which in return used them as its number one campaign weapon and tool. With their activities, the extremist groups provided substantial support to Jobbik to gain popularity and and participate successfully in the 2010 general elections. However, as a general tendency recently, we can see a decline in the number of membership, a fragmentation and an erosion in the skinhead subculture, the Hungarist and neo-Nazi groups, whilst the dominance of the „national radical” groups, namely the New Hungarian Guard and especially the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement (SfCYM) that has always been somewhat independent of Jobbik, are intensively expanding in the regions of Romania (Transylvania) that are densely populated by ethnic Hungarians.

Jobbik as a party was formed in October, 2003 from the movement of the same name. The creators of the movement were primarily conservative university students and there are still many young people among its supporters.

The crippled state of the conservatives following the unexpected defeat of the 2002 elections played a role in the transformation of Jobbik into a party. Another factor was the failure of the entire Hungarian political elite in managing the political and economic transition in the 90’s. The rapid growth of public support for Jobbik Party cannot be attributed only to economic and social conditions in Hungary.

Jobbik took in charge as the only party to face the „unsolved situation of the ever growing gypsy population”. It stated – what everyone knows but is silenced by „political correctness” – that the phenomenon of „gypsy crime” is a real problem.
In the 2006 parliamentary elections the party reached 2.2%, running together with MIÉP (Hungarian Truth and Life Party) on the MIÉP-Jobbik – A Harmadik Út (The Third Way) ticket. Four parties reached the 5% threshold, besides them only the Harmadik Út collected over 1% of the votes. By 2008 the now independent Jobbik was at 7%, according to the polls. Upon the initiation of Gábor Vona, a so called „Cultural Association of the Hungarian Guard“ practically a paramilitary organisation was formed in August 2007. The Guard and its clones with sworn-in members in uniform evoked fear of a considerable segment of society due to their marches and Roma killings/atrocities mainly in the countryside.

At the 2009 European parliamentary elections, Jobbik won 3 seats with 15% of the votes and in doing so came close to beating the ruling Hungarian Socialists into third place.

Hungary's 2010 parliamentary elections saw Jobbik cement its posititon as the nation's 3rd largest party, doubling the vote it had received in the previous year and getting just 3 seats short of the previous ruling party. Jobbik reached 16.67% of the votes in the first round (12.26% in the second round) and delegated 47 deputies into the Hungarian Parliament.

There is a debate that Jobbik is not a neo-Nazi, but a populist right-wing party. However, the majority of the Hungarian public agrees that it is an anti-Semitic, anti-Roma, xenophobic, homophobic, racist and chauvinistic party. Jobbik believes in „Hungary for the Hungarians“ and in a Greater Hungary. Jobbik wants to renegotiate both the borders of Hungary and its membership of the European Union.

To be sure, Hungary like many other European countries experienced difficulties as a result of the 2008 global economic and financial meltdown and ran up substantial public debts. In 2010 the country was close to bankruptcy. Hungary’s transition from a state run economy to market principles was also not easy. From 1990 to 1993 Hungary’s GDP declined by 18% and grew only slowly in the following years.

During the financial crisis Hungary entered a period of recession and between 2008 and 2009, the recession led to another 6.4% decline of GDP. In 2011 due to an export led industrial production growth, the economy grew by 1.6%, but re-entered recession in the first two quarters of 2012.

During the second half of 2013 slow growth came back again, but foreign and domestic investment remained a problem. But part of Jobbik’s political strategy is to drive out foreign companies and foreign investment in Hungary. Jobbik exacerbates the problem by campaigning against the influence of foreign capital and challenging the presence of foreign banks in Hungary.
But Jobbik is not the only problem. A number of actions of PM Viktor Orban’s government also caused concern in Europe, in particular efforts to restrict the independence of the National Central Bank. Whenever useful to cement his power, Viktor Orban does not hesitate to cast the free market principles of the European Union aside.

As reported by Freedom House, „Jobbik supporters are in fact younger, better educated and more well-off than average voters of the two major parties, FIDESZ and the Socialist Party (MSZP).” The percentage of 18-35 years old among Jobbik supporters is higher (40%) than among FIDESZ (32%) or MSZP (19%) supporters. Only the left liberal Green Party LMP has more 18-35 years old among its supporters (43%). Looking at the monthly household income situation, it is again interesting that Jobbik supporters are in the highest income group. Only LMP supporters are better off. FIDESZ and MSZP supporters fall into the group of lower income households. Vice versa: People who come from extremely modest backgrounds and living in badly equipped households are most likely MSZP supporters (54%). Only 26% of Jobbik supporters come from the same background. The number for FIDESZ is 43%. Among the LMP supporters only 22% come from this background.

The majority of Jobbik’s supporters (66%) are male, which differs significantly from the support base of the other political parties taken together, where women (56%) are in the majority. Young people are also overrepresented among those who favour Jobbik: every fourth Jobbik supporter is aged below 30, and every second supporter (52%) is under 40. By and large, they have successfully completed secondary education (41% of them have graduated from high school). Nor does the Jobbik camp lag behind the rest of the population with a party preference in terms of the proportion of supporters who are higher-education graduates. However, the share of Jobbik supporters who have at most eight years of schooling is 50% less than in the two main parties. Furthermore, economic activity – in part a correlate of age – is higher among Jobbik supporters, which means that the poorest are underrepresented among them.

The prevalence of anti-gypsy sentiment is one of the main pillars of Hungarian far-right movements. Anti-gypsy concept has been widely accepted in Hungary in recent decades. But the success of the Hungarian far right over the past five years may not have its origins solely in this: it is worth examining which social groups and attitudes have helped move the far right from the margins to the mainstream and to a socially more accepted position. The following analysis is based mainly on a 2011 TÁRKI representative survey of Hungary featuring 3,000 respondents.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, a „politically correct” public discourse was the mainstream attitude; but this changed significantly after the so-called „Olaszliszka case” of 2006, when the term „gypsy crime” was coined and rapidly gained
currency in public discourse. „Gypsy crime” is not a criminological term; from 2006 on, it became more akin to a political slogan – one that is not only used by people on the far right, but that is also more and more prevalent in the public media as well. In the recent past, there has been a significant change both in the extent of media coverage of the Roma and in the content of news stories: the selection of Roma-related topics is more negative, and the way they are covered has more of an adverse slant. In sum, while there is now more coverage of the Roma in the public domain, and while this coverage tends increasingly to use ethnicity to explain negative features, the public’s attitudes towards the Roma have remained relatively constant (and negative) throughout the period examined.

Between 1994 and 2011, the share of those who harboured anti-Roma sentiments was high and stable. This is illustrated by the results of the 2011 survey, in which one Hungarian adult in ten agreed that the Roma should have more social benefits, whereas eight out of ten respondents thought that the problems of the Roma would be solved if they „finally” started working (the emphasis on „finally” suggesting that finding work depended solely on the Roma). Furthermore, six people in ten agreed with the (radical) statement that crime „is in the blood” of the Roma, while four in ten believed it to be only right that there should still be clubs and pubs which Roma are not allowed to enter, i.e. where the Roma are still discriminated against. On the other hand, eight out of ten supported the integrated education of Roma children, and six out of ten agreed that traditional family values are stronger among the Roma. Thus – despite strong agreement on two positive items – the general trend has been negative throughout the period.

In the recent European parliamentary election Jobbik party has managed to meet its goal, becoming Hungary’s second power, party leader Gabor Vona said late night on Sunday 25 May 2014, after the results were published by the National Election Office (NVI). He added that the Socialists have collapsed, consequently Jobbik can become Fidesz’s challenger. Low turnout is a caution, indicating that Hungarian society does not trust the European Union, he said.

However, Vona’s triumphant statement is based on an incorrect assessment of the situation, but it is also possible that we are dealing with a consciously applied claptrap. Jobbik can rejoice over the victory of the buckled MSZP if the unexpected good results of the DK (Democratic Coalition) and the Egyutt-PM (Together 2014 - Dialogue for Hungary) are ignored, because the Left has cumulatively received almost twice as many votes as the Right. And we have not taken into consideration the LMP (Politics Can Be Different), which has just slid the 5 percent threshold.

Despite the fact that Jobbik at last took the second place at the EP elections, ahead of the MSZP, it remained at the same place as in 2009. The „success” of Jobbik is important both for psychological and political marketing reasons. However, Vona wrongly concluded that Jobbik has the potential to change party positions and has
become the number one challenger of Fidesz. The reality is exactly the opposite. The EP-elections brought Jobbik’s slight decline (roughly about 90 thousand less votes than five years ago) and reduced the chance to replace Fidesz in the near future (it seems to be unlikely even at the local elections in September 2014).

Jobbik probably guessed that most of what they can achieve in this EP-election is to minimize the loss, because Fidesz - engaged in the surreal war of independence - was also curries favours of eurosceptic voters. On top of that the spy suspicion against MEP Bela Kovacs hit Jobbik’s sensitive points and the scandal might have shaken the party’s popularity.

The real failure could have been if Jobbik had not beaten the fragmented Socialists. Jobbik was saved from the embarrassment, but the acquisition of the second place is not a victory, but only a beauty spot. We should not forget that before this year’s parliamentary elections Vona set a goal to overthrow Fidesz. It is worth remembering that Jobbik’s career started with boycotting the 2004 EP-elections and campaigned against joining the EU.

The irony of politics that the EP elections in 2009 brought the breakthrough for Jobbik. The far-right party - which had been allied with the MIEP (Hungarian Justice and Life Party) failed dismally - gained almost 15%, with about 430 thousand votes. In 2010 national elections Jobbik has been further strengthened: the number of supporters doubled to 855 thousand reaching almost 17%.

Half a year before the 2014 parliamentary elections it seemed that Jobbik was down. The party reeling from internal conflicts, moreover, has been a serious competitive disadvantage due to the reconstruction of the electoral system. Fidesz took and efficiently applied a portion of the right-wing radical thesis: it did not attack Jobbik directly, but tried to marginalize it. Fidesz was brilliant to sow dissention and scapegoating and Jobbik’s room for manoeuvre has more and more narrowed. Anti-Semitic and anti-Roma rhetoric started to become boring even among the susceptible population to these ideas.

It is a warning signal for the opponents that Jobbik was able to stand up from there. The party - in terms of the outward appearances - set off in the direction fit for good society. Number of Jobbik’s voters in 2014 national elections passed one million (over 20%). Since the early April national elections, the number of Jobbik voters has shrunk to one third in the EP-elections.

Jobbik best results during the EU parliamentary election were registered in Hungary’s rural areas, while in Budapest and in the big cities Jobbik was less successful. Highest number of votes came from people of the medium educated levels (secondary school, or vocational school) and better off rural population. This rural middle class, in small towns and villages, is facing daily living problems, struggling constantly for survival, fearing of slipping into poverty. The material
deprivation and frustration of this layer have influenced decisively the strengthening of the radical right and its approach to Jobbik. In addition, the rural way of life in many cases associated with uninformed position (one-sided information or isolation from the objective sources of information) contributed to the relatively good end result of Jobbik. It is a pity that with the exception of Fidesz and Jobbik up to now no other party has been able to address the problems of the rural population.

What is wrong with Jobbik?

Jobbik represents a set of values, which might create a distorted, unhealthy society, generating permanent internal tensions and struggles with full of contradictions, destroying the country’s peace, functionality, innovative chances and decent character. These Jobbik values are built - they think - on the hierarchical relationship amongst people along uncontrollable factors, like origin (the presence of Jewish or Gypsy ancestors) and gender identity (5-7 % of people with congenital homosexuality). This perception mode close to Nazism appears in Jobbik’s cultural, educational and social policy endeavors.

If Jobbik came to power, it would constitute an introspective, isolationist policy in Europe. This strategy for small nations like the Hungarian one would lead to fatal backwardness, even state bankruptcy. Jobbik represents a deeply anti-globalization ideology and it would soon leave the European Union. Gabor Vona’s party wants to implement an anti-market economy of dictatorial nature. They are against the big foreign capital, but in favour of the national capital. Jobbik’s anti-capitalist attitude is limited only to the multinationals and it wants to influence the anti-free market mechanisms by state means.

Jobbik wants to use radical means to solve social problems, which means no regard for the principle of social justice. This type of governance perpetuates internal social tensions.

The fourth major concern is that Jobbik proclaims that democracy is not the proper way forward for the Hungarians. Jobbik prefers powerful central management, strong state intervention at all levels, and top down state model.

In summary, I think that dangerous trends and developments are taking place in Hungary, while an alternative political force has not emerged yet in our country. The gravity of the situation is well illustrated by the recently published survey carried out among university-college students concerning the importance of democracy. While in 2008 55% of the respondents believed that democracy is better than any other political system, in 2013 only 42% thought so! The lesson is to be quickly and firmly learnt if in 2018 we want to get rid off Orban’s national-Christian populism and Jobbik’s radicalism (neofascism).
Sources:

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The case of Golden Down

*Dimtris Christopoulos (draft to not be quoted)*

Acknowledge the organization of this seminar on far right since not many people within the left also have perceived the level of the threat.

Why do you deal with the Golden Dawn. Don’t you see that the more you deal the more you add value to them? They are a protest party. The same for the right. It believes that the rise of the Left in Greece is only a matter, a result of the crisis. Naive views. First, the more we are managing the crisis the way we do, the less we should be talking about a crisis. The concept of “crisis” implies the abnormal, the exceptional. As long as the crisis is managed the way it is, it won’t be a crisis anymore. We should be talking about a new regime. And then comes history. Historical amnesia fuels the political and ideological amnesty of the far right. I will draw a circle to end the way I started.

European political history is familiar with the phenomenon of political parties that operate lawfully, yet are either favourably disposed or collaborate with illegal organizations, described as "criminal" or "terrorist" by the current legal order.

Notwithstanding the obvious inconsistencies Golden Dawn is a case that breaks the traditional rule of relations “cell –political wing” : cell and wing coincide. The criminal organization is the political party. Conversely, the political party constitutes a criminal organization since its members engage, under strict hierarchy and coordination, in illegal acts due to the fact that they are its members.

This particular status can be attributed to a number of reasons:

In Greece, due to the recent historical past of coups d’etat, there is a general political culture of intolerance in the prohibition of political parties’ operation. As a result, a party that would, surely, have been declared illegal in most European countries, here is to ensure the privilege of legitimate operation.

Major departments of state institutions, charged with ensuring public order, do not prosecute members of Golden Dawn, even when they provocingly commit crimes, because they express themselves through the means of far-right speech and actions. I particularly refer to the police and the judiciary. Especially the latter, generally, hastens to prosecute and convict with distinctive easiness while, specifically, has shown unbearable toleration.

The third reason, to which this Greek cutting particularity of "political party-terrorist organization" is credited, is the political value that Golden Dawn usage has for the
Greek Right, in the context of the famous theory of "two extremes" where the other end is the left opposition, SYRIZA.

What is it and what went wrong and now faces justice?

The only description suitable for Golden Dawn is that of a Nazi organization. The distinctive features of Nazism – that is, extreme racism and the conception of race-nation as an ultimate value – define fully the organization’s way of action, through assault groups that have been aptly called Assault Battalions and used as a method to “conquer the streets” since its early years. One cannot understand Golden Dawn’s violence unless one realizes that, for Golden Dawn, whoever does not belong to the “race”, according to Golden Dawn’s own definition, is a “subhuman”, no better than an animal; therefore violence against them may reach annihilation, for the sake of the homeland – that is, the race.

Who are the “sub-humans”? Immigrants, Jews, Roma, foreigners, and leftists, these “pseudo-Greeks”. Many wonder how is it possible that a Nazi movement became so popular in Greece, a country that suffered so much during the Occupation under the SS and the Gestapo rule. Yet in Greece, not everyone was a partisan of the Resistance. There were also those who collaborated with the Nazis, who staffed the mechanism of the “national army” and then the “national state”, due to their specialization in fighting against the left and the communists. The cluster of military officers that imposed the 1967 dictatorship originated in these circles. This deeply reactionary mechanism retained its network within the police, the army, the judiciary and the church long after the fall of the Junta. This is the “Greek deep State”. Far right wing extremism.

Golden Dawn’s electorate is formed by three concentric circles. The first one, its central core, is the gang itself, what Golden Dawn has always been. The second one is inspired by the political culture of exculpation of collaborationism and royalism-“juntism”.. The third and largest circle is largely made of parts of an outraged petit-bourgeois class that is being under pressure and practically tends to disappear. This class, led by its youth, has been for the last century fascism’s preferred clientele, and this is something we should not forget. Each circle requires a treatment of its own because it represents a distinct stance. What is certain is that a political strategy to contain neo-Nazism cannot but aim at dissociating these circles, cutting off their inner communication: the outraged petit-bourgeoisie has to find a different outlet for their indignation during the crisis; traditional supporters of the far right have to restrict their longing for the Junta within their closed meetings; and people accused for criminal activities have to be brought under the rule of law.

The strategy of tension went too far. One week before P. Fyssas was murdered, another Assault Battalion had attacked members of the Communist Party, leaving ten injured people behind. A few days later, on September 15, 2012,
Golden Dawn made an appearance, in military formation, in Meligala, Peloponnesus, where the local authorities had organized a memorial celebration highly symbolic for the Greek far right. The only attendants were right-wing citizens, along with their organizations. These were the people attacked by Golden Dawn, led by two of its MPs. In these two cases, Golden Dawn showed that it now turns against both the organized left, with murderous intentions no less, and the right, claiming hegemony, first, on a symbolic level. This was a step beyond anything that the organization had done to that date. These moves clearly revealed its real strategy, which is very similar to the “strategy of tension” carried out by the Italian far right during the 1970s, under the guidance of secret services. The objective then, as now, was to create conditions of blind violent confrontation out in the streets, to cause a “low-tension civil war” and force the intervention of the deep State: the mechanism of repression stricto sensu, the army and the judiciary, in a form of an emergency State. This is the national-racial State promised by the organization.

The roots and the triggering events

How did Golden Dawn manage to skyrocket from 23,000 votes in 2009 to 440,000 in 2012 and 550,000 in 2014? Why is the Greek far right considered to be probably one of the most extreme in Europe? Why is there in Greece Nazism, not e.g. fascism or some other form of right-wing extremism?

The answer is that in Greece there is indeed a convergence of all the adequate and necessary conditions of such a lamentable lead. Let us summarize in distinguishing between rooted causes and triggering events:

Rooted causes

First, there is the historical depth, the legacy of the 20th century, the subsoil with which the connection was never broken. Let us not forget that the Greek subsoil has its own particularities, which are related to some crucial services that only the former collaborationist far right could have provided to the regime during the dark years of the civil war and to the post-civil war parastate against the communist danger. Thus, it is not just that “the fascists were not punished” (which was also the case elsewhere), but most importantly that they have been the pillars par excellence in dealing with the “internal enemy”, up until the institutional peak of the constitutional aberration of the dictatorship. The numbers scored by Golden Dawn in prefectures with a strong far-right tradition during the 20th century prove just this; Laconia, Korinthia, Argolis, Kilkis, etc. – the country’s traditional “black” electoral nests, and, let us add, regions with no immigration issues whatsoever...

Second, there is the social pervasiveness of the ideological soup that forms the basis of far-right ideology all over the Greek political spectrum. Nationalism, racism and sexism are not peculiar to Golden Dawn in Greece, as is of course the
case elsewhere too. However, in Greece, the 1990s brought the intensification of a nationalist discourse that took aggressive features through the new “Macedonian” struggle (that is, the struggle against the use of the denomination “Macedonia” by the adjacent Republic); the whole of the political spectrum, including forces close to the left, and led of course by the Greek-Orthodox church through its then-Archbishop, rose to that bait. The first root that feeds Golden Dawn is Greek nationalism masked as patriotism. It is the fact that whole generations were raised learning bedtime stories instead of history, theories about a “Greek exception” pursued by domestic and foreign enemies.

If the “historical depth” and the “ideological amplitude” of far-right infiltration are the rooted causes that explain the consolidation of a thoroughly totalitarian ideology, election-wise, in almost 10% of the electorate, there are still developments that effectively pulled the trigger, the so-called triggering events.

These are:

The intensification of immigration flows and the blatant failure of the Greek State to administer them institutionally – a failure exploited most effectively by Golden Dawn’s discourse, especially in the difficult neighborhoods of the city of Athens in 2010.

The participation of the far-right party of LA.O.S. in the “technocrats’” government of November 2011, which fueled immensely Golden Dawn’s sky-rocketing in the elections of May and June 2012, since it legitimized the first appearance of an anti-Semitic party in the government power bloc, something unheard of in Greek political history after the fall of the Junta.

The storming impact of crisis in Greece, with all the relevant consequences on people’s lives. On the other hand, we should not forget that the far right is roaring in countries that have not experienced the full consequences of the crisis (e.g., Great Britain, Denmark, Austria), yet is rather weak in countries with perennial high unemployment, such as Spain.

The deep moral discredit of Greek political elites, who, in the eyes of the Greek people, are fully to blame for the country’s current situation. The far right has always aimed at dismantling the “degenerate” ruling elite, finding endless arguments for that in the latter’s faults.

TO CONCLUDE:

The fact that the organization was brought before the law for the first time in its history has practically been a first obstacle in this course, which naturally does not seem reversible with judicial means only. On the other hand, this should not lead us to the conclusion – drawn all-too frequently in Greece – that the criminal
prosecution has a reverse effect, that it victimizes the organization and, by showing it prosecuted, makes it more likeable. One of the “strengths” of Golden Dawn was that it seemed immune; this is not the case anymore, as the Greek State finally showed, even belatedly, that it is indeed somewhere to be found.

Historical amnesia fuels the political amnesty of far-right discourse. However, this much is certain, and multiply crosschecked in European history: the current conditions of crisis and recession are an ideal ground for the growth of the fascist beast. As long as Greece continues as a stigmatized country along a socially painful path of neo-liberal restructuring, the threat of fascistization cannot be considered to have been repulsed just because of the current effort to dismantle Golden Dawn.
Extending the combat zone

*Kerstin Köditz, Volkmar Wölk*

The relationship between extreme right-wing and established political parties in Germany is characterised by competition and cooperation.

I. Almost 70 years after the military defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War, Nazi Germany’s war aims have largely been implemented. The continuation of the war by other means is the result of a form of politics determined by economics. Although a competing system arose in the form of the state capitalism that developed in the USSR, this system collapsed and disappeared due to inefficiency. At the same time, the Nazi’s aims for East and Southeast Europe have been largely implemented; the states in these regions have seen their political sovereignty curtailed, and they are likely to remain economically dependent at least in the medium-term.

II. One of the primary functions of the European Economic Community (EEC) was to keep the Federal Republic of Germany economically integrated into Western Europe. This was done by promising Germany lucrative benefits. However, this integration also placed the Federal Republic in political chains so as to ensure the economic and political elite would not even attempt to move the country towards becoming an independent great power. Today, Germany, which expanded again recently, represents the main power of the – admittedly fragile – imperialist bloc that currently constitutes the European Union. Since the end of the bipolar world system, and the onset of a new multipolar order, the European Union has aimed for a top spot alongside the United States. Subsequently, in the medium-term at least, we should expect a conflict to arise within the German political-economic elite about whether the relationship with the United States should be based more on cooperation or confrontation.

III. The countries of the so-called ‘free West’ represented the main opposition to the USSR. This was particularly true for the Federal Republic, which acted as a central site of struggle between the two systems. However, twenty years after the end of this situation, opposition to the current system continues to be marginalised, or at least on the defensive. This has come about because the countries that implemented
bureaucratic state capitalism defined themselves as ‘real socialist’ states. This has made it possible to denounce all socialist and libertarian alternatives as part of a more or less well-disguised ‘fifth column’ of the former system.

IV. This situation has placed the Left in a fundamentally defensive position that prevents parliamentary-focused left-wing parties from openly opposing the current system. Open opposition would entail rejecting any form of alliance or coalition with other politically relevant parties in parliament, because these would have to be treated as nothing less than the diverse currents and factions of a single neoliberal Unity Party. Left-wing parliamentary politics in Germany is therefore characterised by constant internal conflict. Should the Left present itself as an alternative to the current system, when doing so would leave it isolated in parliament and locked in opposition? Or should it instead offer alternatives to the current neoliberal complex formed by the other political parties, and as such take up the political space that has been traditionally reserved for social democracy? The history of post-war Germany, and the history of the German Left and DIE LINKE (the Left Party) suggest that sooner or later, the latter will occur. However, the experiences of other western European countries demonstrate that doing so places the left in a position in which it poses very little threat to hegemonic neoliberalism.

V. Although the Federal Republic has been faced by crisis since 2007, the country has emerged from the crisis as a winner in both absolute and relative terms. This has been openly accepted even by established conservative politicians such as the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. Economic developments – and this particularly applies to finance capital – have led the EU’s political centre to shift further towards Germany. Germany is now in the position to use its economic power to dictate the EU’s political framework, and the EU is moving further towards becoming a German project.

VI. When points IV and V are taken together, it becomes clear that it will only be possible for left-wing movements from ‘below’ to place sustained and effective pressure on the right-wing at the top if extra-parliamentary forces and organisations regularly organise actions against the Empire as part of a multitude that swiftly and unpredictably changes the issues, forms of action and regions on which it focuses. At the same time, these groups will also have to put increasing pressure onto the Left in parliament and whatever remains of it within neoliberal parties. This could
help end the Left’s isolation in parliament and in neoliberal parties and minimise or at least slow the shift towards the political right.

VII. There is currently no influential left-wing actor in Germany that could assume this role, and it is unlikely that this situation will change in the foreseeable future. In the past, the ecology/anti-nuclear and peace movements, the social movement against Hartz IV, and feminism successfully mobilised on important political issues and ensured they gained strong media attention. However, these movements have either failed or they have been significantly weakened, and protests on these issues only rarely flare-up, such as has been the case with nuclear waste transports.

VIII. The trade unions are the natural allies of extra-parliamentary oppositional movements. However, Germany’s history has led the unions to develop as unity organisations and the strength that results from this also represents a weakness. Traditionally, the German trade unions and their umbrella organisation – the German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) – have been closely linked to the formerly social democratic Social Democratic Party (SPD); however, a minority of official institutional posts in the DGB are actually reserved for members of the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Moreover, the Federal Republic’s direct vicinity to the ‘Eastern bloc’ during the system conflict between East and West meant that over time union demands could be enforced considerably easier and more comprehensively than in other capitalist countries. This generally occurred without resorting to union action. The result of this situation was a corporatist system of social partnership that actively denied the existence of class differences, let alone class antagonism, while relegating the unions to a form of co-management in the workplace. During this period, the union leadership simply aimed to reach compromises. However, these compromises rarely even met the (minimum) demands of the union’s membership. This relatively successful political strategy continued for decades. It led to the development of unions without a strategy, which instead merely focused on their day-to-day tasks, and a membership without experience of the struggles associated with labour disputes. Warning strikes were viewed as the highest form of escalation as strikes had cemented themselves in the Federal Republic’s social consciousness as threatening national interests due to the risk of losing business.
IX. Such a state of affairs had a devastating affect after the end of ‘real existing socialism’: neoliberalism gained hegemony, and this was followed by the intensification and acceleration of social cuts. The few social actors who remained pitted against the neoliberal camp were unable to provide (effective) resistance. Importantly, the process of dismantling the state’s social achievements was continued by the SPD and the Green Party (parties which had previously stood on the side of the people now most affected by these policies). This strategy led the Left to lose considerable influence and support and many party members simply gave up and withdrew from politics altogether.

X. Whenever left-wing ideologies are weakly anchored, and left-wing organisations are marginalised, it becomes far easier for extreme right-wing ideologies to increase their strength. But this does not always result in the development of new right-wing party-like organisations. Essential aspects of extreme right-wing thought can easily be taken up or implemented in a milder form – if not fully – by existing conservative and national-liberal right-wing parties. In such situations, the extreme right merely takes on the role of a controlling mechanism that amplifies the influence of right-wing ideologies. The growing strength of the right also indicates that hegemonic politics is malfunctioning; in turn, this implies that hegemonic conservatism will have to make the changes that are needed if the current balance of power is to be secured.

XI. This reciprocal relationship between the hegemonic right and right-wing extremists is not based on a direct, open agreement. However, it has been favoured by a number of factors existing in post-war Germany. Germany’s National Socialist past and its re-nazification, which began during the initial and early stages of the Federal Republic, led to the development of an essential state dogma. Politicians were expected to present themselves as having been ‘democratically purged’, demonstrate that they had learned their lessons from the Nazi experience and that they would ensure that a National Socialist regime would never develop again. As a consequence, intensive cooperation between the extreme and the democratic right took place precisely in fields that had not been key elements of Nazi ideology. These groups’ shared ideological underpinnings provided the basis for an important project that could be implemented in the present, but also promised to provide the basis of a project in the future. The associations of (so-called) expellees played an essential role here, as they continually questioned the validity of the post-war borders. This discursive project, which was linked to anti-
II. A central aspect of the alleged complete break with the Nazi past was the idea that Germany and Germans had learned from the genocide of the European Jews and now immediately stifled even the slightest expression of anti-Semitism. Whereas Germany had previously been characterised by a form of exterminatory anti-Semitism, this had now transformed into philo-Semitism and the complete disavowal of criticism. Later, this approach led to the demand for unconditional solidarity with Israeli government policies. This approach was not without its problems, but it undoubtedly prevented historical revisionism concerning Germany’s Nazi past, which particularly meant that questioning German responsibility for the Holocaust now violated Germany’s raison d’état and was punished accordingly. Organised anti-Semitism invariably led to social isolation. This meant that anyone who was openly supportive of the Nazi era and Nazi ideology was doomed to political failure. This was even true during a period of German post-war history in which the biographies of the overwhelming majority of influential people had been blighted by the indelible mark of having participated in the Nazi state. Of course, this approach was unable to prevent the continuation of a hidden virulent anti-Semitism (both then and now), especially in conversations among regulars in public houses. In fact it also led discourses to be marked by the central motif that Jews now formed a particularly privileged group and were not allowed to be criticized even if this criticism was justified. This of course was an adaption of the age-old anti-Semitic stereotype of Jews as a vanishingly small social minority who commanded an unduly vast array of power.

III. Organisations that adopted a positive stance towards historical fascism were placed under strong political pressure; this either forced them into isolation or to dissolve. Yet this situation did not come about because the dominant political forces had suddenly become anti-fascist, rather it was based on Germany’s desire for recognition from its new partners in the West. This was particularly true in the early phases of the Federal Republic. At the time, the Federal Republic was attempting to defy East German criticism. East Germany argued that the Federal Republic constituted the ‘state of the perpetrators’, represented the continuation of the Nazi state by other means, and was being largely run by the same
people as during the Nazi regime. As this last claim was very simple to demonstrate – there were many documents that demonstrated a continuity of personnel in terms of politics, industry, the judiciary, the civil service as a whole and later also within the military – it became particularly important for the Federal Republic to confirm that it was taking consistent action against fascist organisations.

XIV. However, the exclusion exerted by the German state was only ever directed at organisations, and not at their members and officials. This meant that after the Nazi Socialist Reich Party (SRP) had been banned – and even during the process leading up to the ban – many leading cadres and members of the party had little problem swapping over to the parties allied with the ruling CDU. Without exception, the CDU’s allies were more right-wing than the party itself and shared at least some major areas of the marginalised extreme right’s ideology. A considerable proportion of the people active in these parties had also been active followers of the Nazi regime. This of course facilitated the transition and made the switch far more attractive to the SRP’s membership. This constant interplay of carrot and stick ultimately ensured that it was impossible for extreme right-wing parties to permanently establish themselves until the foundation of the National Democratic Party (NPD) in 1964. Even if the CDU’s approach towards the extreme right alternated between cooperation and confrontation, its goal was to marginalise it. However, the consistent implementation of this strategy eventually led to the failure and collapse of the CDU’s previous alliance partners. The great reactionary, Franz-Josef Strauss, later constructed one of the dogmatic cornerstones of the strategy of party-like conservatism, when arguing that there should be “no democratically legitimate party” to the right of the CDU.

XV. During long periods in the history of the Federal Republic, the ideological congruence between the CDU and the extreme right was sufficiently strong to enable this policy to be implemented. In contrast, parliamentary representation for the extreme right remained the exception. The essential areas that linked these political camps were anti-communism, nationalism, and the acceptance of ties with the West. Other components of their ideology always played a secondary role. As ties to the West were closely linked to the economic success of the Federal Republic, only a minority of the extreme right ever questioned this alignment. Moreover, without ties to the West there would have been no chance of reaching the ultimate nationalist goal: the recovery of the territories in the east that had been lost after the Second World War. As such, whereas the
conservatives considered association with the West as an end in itself, the extreme right viewed ties with the West as a strategic tool. Ideologically the alliance of the two right-wing camps was built on conceptual models such as those of ‘Occidental ideology’ or appeals to a common ‘Christian heritage’. Factors interfering with these models such as the extreme right’s traditional anti-Americanism or the rejection of Britain as a ‘nation of shopkeepers’ remained secondary in comparison.

XVI. The strategy of stigmatising the extreme right that has existed throughout the history of the Federal Republic, and the taboo of working together with their organisations, led ‘leaders of society’, higher members of the state apparatus, the military, as well as intellectuals and academics to scrupulously avoid even appearing in the same context as the extreme right; there were of course very rare exceptions to this. However, research into public opinion has demonstrated that it was precisely these occupational groups and social classes that demonstrated above average levels of support for the extreme right. In contrast, the current NPD membership base is almost exclusively working class. The history of the extreme right in the Federal Republic demonstrates that ‘respectable’, notable people, tend to commit themselves to the extreme right only after it has already made political gains and more growth is to be expected.

XVII. The history of social exclusion faced by the extreme right meant that no single factor was ever enough to provide it with notable successes. In fact, it has only ever successfully exploited the existing right-wing potential by combining at least two relevant issues and persuading its target group that the conservative right was not in the position to avert the perceived danger. This was true in the heydays of the NPD in the late 1960s. The new Ostpolitik, which was aimed at bringing about a change in the real socialist camp under the guise of reduced confrontation, actually threatened to break the existing political consensus, namely, that Germany would never accept the loss of territory associated with its contemporary borders. At the same time, the rebellion among parts of the younger generation from 1967 onwards shook the Republic. The rebellion targeted hitherto consensual values and moral codes, and not least questioned the personal participation of the Federal Republic’s elites in the Nazi regime. Confronted with this situation, the conservative right seemed unable to provide an ‘adequate’ response.

XVIII. Discontent among the extreme right also increases significantly when the distinction between the conservative right and the left no longer appears
to be significantly clear. Similarly, it also occurs when the nation’s sovereignty is attacked ‘from outside’ and the right perceives the response to this situation as inadequate. The neoliberal project is an economically focused complex that continually and necessarily generates contradictions to purely nationalist interpretations of power politics. This discontent increasingly creates fissures and divisions that are brought together by a modernised extreme right. Modernisation leads the extreme right to avoid openly promoting the Nazi era and Nazi ideology – a new development in the history of the Federal Republic. Importantly, this may now mean that the extreme right will be able to win over appreciable parts of the elite. If these so-called experts are willing to use their commitment to improve the reputation of the modern extreme right-wing project, the chances of its success will continue to grow. This will particularly be the case if these ‘experts’ do not come from the conservative camp. Clearly, when the CDU becomes less conservative, and the SPD less social democratic, the main political parties become far less distinguishable. This greatly increases a new right-wing project’s chances of success.

XIX. Germany has now clearly become part of European normality. The social elites have accepted the predictable emergence of the new extreme right-wing political spectrum. Germany’s historical, social, cultural and political-ideological framework suggests that we are only at the beginning of this process. The current political conditions, as well as the weakness of the left and the dilemmas it faces, mean that pushing back the new extreme right will be an extremely tedious task. It will surely be similar to Sisyphus pushing the boulder up the hill. There is no alternative, but if we believe the great libertarian thinker, Albert Camus, then Sisyphus was a happy man.
Recent developments in the French far right

Stéphane François

My talk will cover three points: first, the birth of identity-based nationalist movements around the year 2000; second, the development of the populist stance taken by the Front national (FN); and third, the strategy to destigmatize, or mainstream, the FN.

I) Major developments in far-right political movements: a greater focus on identity and a more populist stance

It is important to take into account the early 2000s in order to understand developments that have taken place in certain currents of the French and, more broadly, the Western European far right. This is when the ethnic-nationalist identity-based movements appeared, although they had been in existence in embryonic form for some time. In France, for example, the main school of thought on the far right that focused on identity was the GRECE (Groupement de recherché et d’études pour la civilisation européenne – Research and Study Group for European Civilization); and the first French group to focus on identity was Terre & Peuple, founded in 1995 by former members of the GRECE (Pierre Vial, Jean Mabire and Jean Haudry), initially as a current within the FN and subsequently as an independent formation.

In fact, the identity-based movement only really took off after 11 September, 2001. In my opinion there were two factors behind this. One was the rejection of Islam and Muslims, who were seen as fifth columnists; the other was the rejection of globalisation, which in the view of these groups uproots populations and causes immigration, and as such represents a threat to French, European and Western identity. This new development also demonstrates the transition from the biological to the cultural: the Other is no longer rejected because of physical appearance, but because of their culture’s supposed incompatibility with that of Europe. However, it is important to bear in mind that this does not mean that biological racism has disappeared – it is just dressed up as cultural racism, and this is blatantly obvious with certain ‘identity’ activists.

In France, the main identity-based organisation is the Bloc Identitaire-Mouvement Social Européen (BI), founded in 2003, born from the ashes of Unité Radicale (UR), which was dissolved in 2002 following the attempted assassination of President Jacques Chirac on 14 July 2002 by a UR activist. Besides the dissolution of the UR,
the creation of the BI has to be seen as one of the major effects of the restructuring which took place within far right movements in Europe following the 11 September attacks. Between 2001 and 2003, the future identity-based movement shifted its focus from a discourse denouncing ‘American imperialism’ as the principal enemy to that of a struggle against Islamism and Muslim immigration. The former aspect has been almost completely abandoned today. The political discourse has now refocused on people’s ‘roots’, localism, the defence of European peoples (a defence linked to the rejection of Islam) and ethno-regionalism. This development can be seen in Belgium with the Vlaams Belang, and in Italy with the Lega Nord.

In terms of its ideology, the Bloc Identitaire defends a form of ‘ethnic socialism’, influenced by the thinking of French Waffen-SS member Saint-Loup (the pen name of Marc Augier). However the reference to Saint-Loup was dropped by the BI and replaced by that of Dominique Venner. It also took up the ideas of Guillaume Faye, which can be summed up as ‘helping our people’ (in the racial sense of the expression) ‘before helping other people’ (in other words immigrants, who are viewed as invaders). The Bloc Identitaire therefore advocates the repatriation of immigrants to their country of origin, and identity-based movements reject globalisation because they see it as destroying identity.

**II) The FN and public services**

This rejection of globalisation has also become the hallmark of the FN. As you know, this political party started to attract workers back in 1986, and did so on a massive scale ten years later. This change in its electorate forced the party to change from a xenophobic and ultra-liberal party to an Islamophobic party and a defender of public services. This last point is very important, because as far as I know it has not been researched.² In fact this is the main recent development, together with the greater focus on identity, within the French far right. Ironically, having denounced the mismanagement of the state for nearly a century (from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth century), the far right is now starting to defend civil servants!

Since Marine Le Pen became the leader of the FN, the ideological discourse has changed and taken a more ‘populist’, or at least a ‘neo-populist’ direction. Marine Le Pen constantly emphasises her role as a defender of the people against globalisation, against outsourcing and against the UMP and the PS (the other main political parties) who she claims have betrayed the people. However, the FN’s ‘neo-populism’ was actually invented by her father in 1990. He developed this approach by aggressively emphasising the issues he viewed as important (immigration, the

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perceived lack of security, unemployment, criticism of Europe, national and regional identity, etc.). In contrast, Marine Le Pen’s populism stems from a revolt against having to share the benefits of a social welfare system, which are seen as having been hard-earned over time, with newcomers – immigrants – who are deemed as undeserving. This is an example of what Pascal Perrineau has called ‘welfare state chauvinism’.

In fact, for some years now the FN has emphasised economic discourse, in particular the ravages of de-industrialisation. In fact, the party has come a long way in this area. In 2007, the FN’s programme was still quite liberal and until recently, the party remained conspicuously absent when it came to social struggles. This changed in 2010, when the FN gained a very high share of its vote from workers (about 29%).

Marine Le Pen now presents herself as the defender of public services against the ravages of globalisation. Indeed, although the party defends the capitalist system, the FN is perceived by part of its electorate as more left-wing than the Parti Socialiste or the Front de gauche. But above all, the de-industrialisation of France and the crisis that has persisted for the last 40 years have made it possible to introduce a discourse of social competition between French people and foreigners. And this discourse has been all the more effective since the economic phenomenon it focuses on is part of the global destruction of societies that is occurring throughout free-market democracies. Social fragmentation, the emergence of the problem of deprived inner-city areas, globalisation; all of these issues appear to confirm the discourse denouncing the destruction of the national framework.

These developments in the party’s economic position enabled the shift – we could even say conversion – of former left-wing party supporters towards the ideas of the FN. In the regions particularly badly hid by the crisis and de-industrialisation, the working class has remained suspicious of ‘globalism’ and the EU, and believes it has been abandoned by the socialist and communist parties. This has convinced many people who were keen supporters of these parties that the FN is now their only hope, in spite of the fact that the changes this party has made are only recent.

A good number of French people have fears that are related to economic and social conditions, but also about culture and identity. There is a desire to look inwards, ‘to ourselves’, ‘to people who are like us’ and reject the Other out of a fear of ‘cultural insecurity’ prompted by neo-liberal globalisation. In addition, these people retain a strong attachment to their village or town, to their region, to their local popular festivals, to their place of work. There are some within the FN who, having acknowledged this strong attachment, advocate ‘social nationalism’, and defend a form of localism which, on this issue, brings them close to the Identitaires.
Marine Le Pen has also recognised this attachment, and in contrast to her father has adopted the recurring theme of the need to defend public services. If we look at the website of the FN, there are explicit references to public services in the section entitled: ‘Public services: a tool that promotes equality’. The FN also notes, quite rightly, that French people are not only very attached to their local area, but also to their public services. Cutbacks in public services in rural areas, as a result of budgetary restrictions and the implementation of the public policies reform programme (Réforme Générale des Politiques Publiques – RGPP), were used by the FN to defend its territory. It accused the UMP and the PS of being responsible for dismantling these services, and ignored the fact that identical proposals were made by the FN’s former leader as early as 1980.

The opportunism of the FN means that it does not hesitate to state that, “Public services are an essential vector of equality among citizens. Reinstating public services is therefore an essential priority of the presidential programme and is fully consistent with the restoration of a strong state across the whole of the country.” Consequently, the new FN proposes to combat the liberalisation and privatisation of public services, and attacks governing parties. The objective is to denounce ‘the modernisation compromise’, adopted between 1984 and 1991.

Ingeniously, the party also denounces inequalities resulting from the closure of public services that are not financially viable. That said, it has focused on rural areas and not deprived inner-cities, which are also affected by this same policy. This leads us to question the sincerity of the fight by the FN against closures or cutbacks in public services. Focusing on this issue is not a random choice but a decision informed by its intention to place this policy in a specific social and national context. In fact the FN primarily focuses on preventing reductions to state funding on specific public services such as the police, justice and defence. The FN calls for a strong state, and as such these services are essential. More recently, it has broadened its approach to include education, health and child welfare services. Its defence of education is not innocuous: this milieu, considered a traditional bastion of the left, has voted for the right since the 2012 presidential election.

III) The strategy to destigmatize the Front national

As well as changes in discourse, the principal new factor among the French far right in recent years is the strategy adopted by the current president of the FN to destigmatize or mainstream the party. Marine Le Pen has rid the party of a number of radical elements, notably supporters of her father and of Bruno Gollnisch. Nevertheless, there are still some radical elements in the FN, for example the nationalist revolutionary Christian Bouchet, a candidate in Nantes. These issues are

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3 http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/autorite-de-letat/services-publics/.
4 Ibid.
also regularly reported in the media. What is less well known is that her close circle includes radicals such as Frédéric Chatillon, former leader of the GUD (Groupe Union Defense – a right-wing student organisation) and a French supporter of Putin and Assad. We also find the son of senior civil servant Jean-Yves Le Gallou, who helped develop the ‘national preference’ policy in her inner circle. I could also mention a number of other examples.

To come back to the point: Marine Le Pen seems to have made her party more ‘respectable’ and above all more acceptable to be associated with. She regularly condemns the provocative outbursts made by her father. And as she does not deploy the same extremist, aggressive and provocative discourse as her father, she is sometimes seen as more moderate. This is illustrated by the fact that certain dissidents from the mainstream parties – from the left as well as the right – have joined her Rassemblement Bleu Marine (RBM), but avoid the FN because of the presence of her father. An analysis of the RBM’s lists at the last local elections provides some interesting information: alongside the activists jumping on the identity bandwagon, there is even a relatively large number of Jewish candidates, and they would have never joined the FN.

Lastly, we need to take account of one more fact: the shift to the right and the embracement of far-right ideas by a segment of the right-wing governing party. The discourse of the then president Nicolas Sarkozy about national identity enabled the most right-wing fringe of the UMP to express reactionary and sometimes racist views. This right-wing minority would have welcomed an alliance with the FN, and abandoned the idea of the ‘glass ceiling’ aimed at preventing such alliances. Finally, we must not forget that the UMP was formed by members of the RPR and the UDF, and that some members of the latter were known for their conservative or reactionary positions, or even for their history as activists in extreme right-wing groups. However, we need to be prudent: everyone can change, and abandon extremist positions. Similarly, we should not ignore the alliances that have been made in the past with the far right, including with Charles Baur in Picardy, Charles Millon in Lyon, Yann Piat. But we seem to have forgotten about these.
The Euro-elections and the need for political caution and realism

*Euro-vote epic over bar the shouting…*

_Graeme Atkinson_

…and there was plenty of that in the European media’s post-election frenzy – echoed astonishingly by many “anti-fascists” – about the electoral performance of the far right and right-wing populists with words like “surge”, “sensational”, “political earthquake”, “seismic” and “stunning” being lavishly bandied about to describe the results. “Avalanche”, “tsunami” and “landslide”, mercifully, did not hove into view.

Across the European Union (EU), voters vented their spleen, expressing real and imagined grievances against austerity, immigration, unemployment, the EU in whole or part, the Euro currency, the ubiquity of corruption and their own widespread feelings of disillusionment, dissatisfaction, disenfranchisement, disenchantment and alienation.

In a general sense, it is incontestable that the overall results marked a further rightward shift of the electorate and have _pro tem_ dramatically shaken up the domestic political situation both in the UK and France with UKIP and the Front National (FN), respectively, winning most votes and also in Denmark. It is too early to say, however, what their long-term impact will be.

The main focal point of attention after the ballot apart from United Kingdom Independence Party’s (UKIP) spectacular result in the United Kingdom, was France where the FN, led by Marine Le Pen, scored an expectedly large win, polling almost 26%, winning the votes of 4,711,339 voters and administering a sharp slap in the face to France’s mainstream and mostly venal political leaders. The FN will now have 24 MEPs in the new 751-seat European Parliament (EP).

In other countries, too – Denmark and Austria – parliamentarist, far rightist and anti-immigrant populists scored well but, again, hardly unpredicatably. In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party (DF), which was courted by Le Pen in an attempt to form an official group and grab even more cash in Brussels, bumped up its share of the popular vote up by over 11% to 26.6%, doubling its seats in the European Parliament (EP) from two to four.

In Austria, the now-populist but still extremist Freedom Party took 19.7%, compared with 12.7% in 2009 and, like the DF, will increase its tally of seats from two to four while the anti-immigrant, Islamophobic Sweden Democrats managed to slither into the EP to take two seats.
Even the hardcore violent nazi right got in on the act: the possibly-about-to-be-illegal Golden Dawn in Greece grabbing between 9 and 10% of the vote and sending three of its travelling circus of meatheads to Strasbourg.

They have been joined by a solitary member of the German nazi National Democratic Party (NPD) that got just 1% but is only being shoehorned into a European Parliament seat thanks to a change in electoral law by Germany’s Constitutional Court. Three fascists from Jobbik, whose vote faltered in Hungary, have joined this quartet.

While in reflecting the general mood of fear – much of it politician and media-fostered – in the EU and understandable concerns about the probity of a huge swathe of the political class, there were also some notable successes for Eurosceptic outfits like the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Finns Party, it was not exactly all “uncork the champagne” for the assorted extremists and populists.

Another nail was hammered into the coffin of the once-formidable Vlaams Belang (VB) which, lost more than half its support, falling from 9.8% to 4.62%. Across the border in the Netherlands, the much-touted anti-Muslim populist Geert Wilders had the arrogant smile wiped off his face, his Freedom Party (PVV) coming in third, having been expected to win the day.

In Italy, the Lega Nord, which has also lined up with Mme. Le Pen, got 6% – a steep drop from the 10.21% it got five years ago – and lost four of its nine seats. In other countries, the results for the far right were hardly dramatic.

Questions have been raised about the British right-wing, anti-EU populist party, UKIP

UKIP is a xenophobic, Islamophobic party. It combines the English nationalism of the late Enoch Powell with the populist anti-immigrant and anti-EU stance of northern and western European parties like the True Finns, the Danish People’s Party and Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party.

UKIP is not a fascist party nor is it a racist party of the nazi British National Party (BNP) type.

For the hardcore of BNP members (and 31% of their voters in the 2009 European elections), their racism stemmed from a belief that non-whites were genetically inferior to white Britons. While 17% of UKIP voters had this view, 58% did not.

Similarly, while 44% of BNP voters disagreed with the notion that “non-white British citizens who were born in this country are just as ‘British’ as white citizens born in this country”, only 18% of UKIP voters felt the same, compared to 64% who agreed.
At the same time UKIP leaflets began to focus more generally on immigration and multiculturalism, one even carrying a picture of a Native American Indian, with the words: “He used to ignore immigration ... now he lives on a reservation.”

87% of UKIP voters in the 2009 European Elections believed that “all further immigration to the UK should be halted”.

A 2012 YouGov poll of 1,505 UKIP supporters, found:
• 51% do NOT believe that Britain has benefited from immigration (compared with 25% who do)
• 35% think immigrants should be sent back to their ‘home’ country
• 51% believe that immigrants are the main source of crime (21% disagree)

Immigration has evolved into the most important issue for UKIP supporters. Europe as an issue comes second or even third.

UKIP came first in the European elections with 27.49% of the vote. As a result, they secured 24 MEPs, an increase of 11 from 2009.

The party also won 161 seats in council elections, at a 14% share of the national vote in the local elections, taking its total representation in local government to 383 seats out of more than 21,000 in England and Wales.

The 2014 HOPE not hate campaign – the only one to challenge UKIP – was its biggest election campaign to date. 2.35m newspapers and leaflets were distributed across the length and breadth of the country, far exceeding anything we have done before.

Central to our campaign was the production of 41 different versions of a tabloid newspaper, each customised for local areas.

In addition to delivering material door-to-door in our traditional areas, the national threat of UKIP meant action took place in dozens of new areas, particularly in the Midlands and the south east.
A weekend of action saw 130 people turn out in Bradford, over 70 in Manchester and 55 in Brighton. These 95 events were surpassed by the 130 mass leafleting sessions organised for Transport Tuesday when activists leafleted railway stations across England. (UKIP is basically an English party).

In addition to this, we had an eight-page supplement inside the Daily Mirror, which was funded by almost 600 of our supporters.

We attempted to address our material for different audiences, with much of the focus being trying to explain why anger at migrant workers was misdirected. Some general observations must be made about the election as a whole.

Looking at the arithmetic of the election results, the following emerges:

firstly, if we subtract the votes for UKIP (GB) and VOX (Spain) – which maybe should not be listed among the extremists – from the 16,835,421 total votes of the far right, we arrive at an amended total of 12,240,279.

Secondly, if we subtract the 3,619,357 votes difference between the Front National vote in 2014 and 2009 from this amended total of 12,240,279, we arrive at a further amended total of 8,620,922.

This is a smaller total than the 10,667,818 votes that the far right polled in 2009. In fact, it indicates that the general far right vote actually fell by 2,046,896 votes in 2014 compared with 2009.

So just where is this generalised, much talked-about, media-hyped “rise of fascism”, “rise of right-wing extremism” etc (except in France)? Because, even with the huge increase in FN support, the overall far right vote in the EU grew only by 1.57 million over the 2009 score with an additional country – Croatia – in the mix. Indeed, apart from in the UK (if we include UKIP), Denmark, Hungary and France, the far right lost votes everywhere and only won 34 seats.

Hyperbole and wild statements suggesting that the roof is falling in only frighten people, paralyse resistance and deter engagement. They help nothing.

The fight against fascism, right-wing populism and the vile hate prejudices that nourish them has to go on strongly, energetically, intelligently and on a much broader basis.

Fear has no place in that perspective.
1. Radical right political parties in Poland

There were two parties on the Polish political scene which can be classified as radical right:

The New Right/ in the last European Parliament elections it received 7.15% of the votes and won 4 seats.

The National Movement/ in the last European Parliament elections it received 1.40% of the votes and won 0 seats.

The New Right was founded by Janusz Korwin-Mikke, who has been active on the Polish political scene for 23 years, with little success up till now.

His first party, the Union of Real Politics, was able to capture 3 seats in the first free elections of 1991, after that it never received support that would higher than the 5% threshold.

The Union of Real Politics presented a libertarian agenda. It praised the free market and the total abandonment of the “socialist economy principals”, which was able to attract attention in the beginning of the transition process.

Korwin-Mikke’s agenda has not changed since then:

Healthcare should work just like the privatized veterinarian sector, pensions should be financed from privatization, schools and universities should charge fees, taxes should be lowered, the handicapped should stay at home and women should only be responsible for raising children. Women do not need the right to vote, because they no little of politics. The Jews control the world.

In the European elections Korwin-Mikke and his party received support from the so called “protest electorate”.

In the last election voters from this group supported the Palikot Movement, a party named after its leader a famous millionaire Janusz Palikot. This party, later named Your Movement, was the basis for a coalition called Europe Plus. Palikot’s party wanted to present itself as a social and more or less leftwing orientated.
Palikot’s agenda was based on anticlericalism, feminism and support for the LGBT movement. The party cooperated with Piotr Ikonowicz, a well known Polish socialist and tenants’ rights activist.

Among those who became MPs from Palikot’s party list were: a transsexual women, a leader of the LGBT movement and a well know women’s rights activist, who work many year for the liberalization of the restrictive Polish anti-abortion law.

In the European elections the Europe Plus coalition was unable to win any seats.

According to representatives of the New Right, who received votes from the same group that voted for Palikto’s Movement in the last election, gay marriages are like “square circles” that cannot function, abortion is a criminal act and should be judged as such. In Brussels they intend to fight for traditional values and to “make life easier for entrepreneurs”, who are oppressed by limitation as and bureaucracy.

The National Movement is a political formation, that is inspired by the successes of the National Front in France and keeps informal contacts with the Hungarian Jobbik and the Greek Golden Dawn.

It has between 5 to 10 thousand members.

Many known rightwing politicians were candidates of the National Movement during the last elections:

Artur Zawisza (former member of parliament and of PiS party, a head figure of the rightwing political scene – see next parts of this text), Robert Winnicki (former head of the All-Poland Youth, an affiliated youth organization of the League of Polish Families), Krzysztof Bosak (former League of Polish Families MP) Witold Tumanowicz (the organizer of the November 11th Independence Marches), Marian Kowalski (spokesperson for the Polish National Rebirth).

The National Movement’s agenda for the EP election was focused on building a Europe of Fatherlands instead of European federalism, fighting with the European left tendencies, combating limiting CO2 emissions, as being harmful to the Polish economy, forcing Polish historical narration (so that no one speaks of Polish death camps).

The party expected to capture about 3 seats and get about half a million of votes, based on the popularity of the so called Independence Marches, organized each November 11th (Polish Independence Day), which gather tens of thousands participants.

To register its electoral comity the National Movement collected 150 thousand signatures of support. In the elections it received 98 626 votes.

The expected 505 586 votes was the result of the Korwin-Mikke’s New Right.
The National Movement was unable to have the same success as the League of Polish Families in 2004 when the party took 10 seats in the European Parliament with 969,689 votes, which accounted for 15,92%.

1. **Co-reactions with social forces: the Independence March.**

The National Movement defines itself as a party of young people, the average age of the electoral list leaders was below 35.

Their main slogan “patriotism” is seen by NM activists as everyday work – they commemorate the Anathematized Soldiers, people who fought with communism, they visit places significant for Polish history, they give out flags.

The National Movement was formed around the Independence March, where, as its leader stated: “under the white-red banner tens of thousands patriots gathered”

[Rzeczpospolita, 29-21.04.2014, interview with Artur Zawisza “We are not a sect”]

Acts of vandalism, aggression and arson during the Independence March are described by its leader Artur Zawisza as clashes in the field of real social conflict:

“There are clashes, but it is not we that are the instigators. Each of them happened in the field of a real social conflict. This was either an illegally occupied empty building in the center of the city (an anarchist squat), a provocative homo-rainbow (an artistic construction – a rainbow made of paper flowers to celebrate Poland’s membership in the EU), or an embassy of a county that is contacted to annexation of Polish lands, Katyń and Smoleńsk (Russian Embassy).

I do not mean to say that street fights are our way of doing politics. But real life social emotions are something else than cabinet games”.

Nationalism that is represented by his party is described as Christian nationalism:

**Christian nationalism** must reject any movements against the rights of nations and moral norms. The history of German chauvinism has pagan routes and lead to criminal acts in Europe”.

2. **Who is a nationalist?**

After the events of the 2013 Independence March when a lot of vandalistic acts were committed (an attack on an anarchist squat, setting fire to a rainbow contraction on one of the squares in Warsaw and throwing rocks at the Russian embassy) there was a debate in the Polish media on who is a “nationalist” (a supporter of radical right ideas) and why so many young people participate in the Independence March, why is it very popular with the younger generation.
The radical right has big support from younger people: high school and college students, unemployed, football fans – one needs to note that most people in the nationalist ranks are men. The mentioned social groups can not in any way be identified with conservative social forces. Conservative social forces gather around parties like Law and Justice, Solidarity Poland, Poland Together. None of these parties – when taking into account there political program – can be called as having fascist tendencies or as radical right!!

They rather tend to support a creation of a certain kind of confessional state, that is based on Christian values than a state based on Christian nationalism. It is no coincidence that some of the radical right activists have at some point left the above mentioned parties, as they were not radical enough for them. A specific type of a “confessional state” is the Wołomin district near Warsaw, where the council is dominated by PiS. Another leader of the National Movement Robert Winicki (28 years old) commented on the flights and arson during the Independence March [Gazeta Wyborcza 4.12.2013]:

“A symbol of a disease has burned down (on the burned rainbow construction)! A symbol of the biggest threat to Poland – leftist revolution” The crowd is cheering. They chant: “Not red, not rainbow but national Poland” alongside “God, honor and fatherland”.

“We want to create a new type of Pole: organized, disciplined, a person that his head together, but will also be a radical against leftists. A man who is not afraid and stands firm on the ground of the national agenda”.

“Political correctness says that any criticism of Jews means anti-Semitism. We believe that we have a right to criticize them, for example when they use for their own game the mythology that the Holocaust was a special kind of genocide in the XX century, that should be treated differently, as if there was no greater crimes. For criticizing the Polish Communist Party or the Stalinist Jew-Communists you can also be an anti-Semite”.

A polemic voice was presented in the biggest daily newspaper “Gazeta Wyborcza” [Gazeta Wyborcza] 7-8.12.2013). The author, a representative of the younger generation and an observer of the national movements in Poland, wrote a manifest entitled: “We are desperate and you are making fascists out of us”.

In an interview with a “Gazeta Wyborcza” journalist he tried to explain the idea of Christian nationalism, in which the younger generation can find itself.

“Down with the commune” – that means with who? [journalist’s question]

“With the system. With all affiliated with party bureaucrats, political capitalism, corruption, local nepotism, that makes us fell we do not give us equal rights... If I...
have family or political connections or I have enough cash to bribe the right person, then I am successful in business and politics. If I do not have that I lose. Corruption cemented inequality in access to success. I may be better, I may have better ideas but I will lose none the less”.

The young generation of rebelled nationalists relate to the *Anathematized Solders*, who fought with the system established in Poland after the war, that is today called communism:

“*The Anathematized* are revolutionaries, they grow up to idea of revolution, that is to the attempt to change the political and social reality. Be it Wrocław (city in western Poland) or Białystok (city in eastern Poland) they often tell me that they had enough, that they no longer want to allow for being cheated. They are the ones that come to our marches.

People born between 1980-1990. A whole generation that grew up with the myth of success. “Invests in yourself, learn to speak foreign languages, do internships, develop your skills and you are guaranteed to have equal access to freedom and success”.

*The Anathematized* are a generation of people who invested in themselves and now see more and more closed paths”.

Violence during Independence Marches and as an ideological concept is an answer to violence, that justifies it. “Isn’t half an euro per hour, 160 hours a week in a call center violence”.

“Socialism is a thing of the past and it did not work out. What is left. Christian nationalism... Even though these *Anathematized* are not especially religious nor clerical, they live in non-marriage partnerships and premarital sex is an everyday thing for them”.

“Anti-Semitism, homophobia, widely interpreted fascism are the fastest ways for an outside the system road to success”.

The open question remains: Why didn’t the young generation vote for the National Movement and its leaders from the Independence March?

And can this change some day?

Can the second nationalist party the New Right of Janusz Korwin-Mikke become an element of the Polish political scene and receive support from a stable electorate (not only does protest voters that move form party to party with no greater need to identify with the parties political aim)?
Ukraine: moving common opinion right

Nataliia Neshevets and Illia Vlasiuk

In this essay we try to overview roots, conditions and actions of far-right groups in Ukraine today. General question is acceptability of radical nationalist rhetoric and aesthetic by big part of Ukrainian society, moving common opinion right and hegemony of nationalism. We look through a couple of the most representative far-rights groups including also Russian nationalism presence in Ukraine. And finally we try to suggest value and reasons of their impact on politics, society and culture. This paper is written not from politological or sociological point of view, but presented grass roots activist perspective based on experience of steer politics which usually is ignored by academic researchers.

**Introductio into cultural context**

Speaking about cultural superstructure which has huge impact on rise of far-right in Ukraine also economical base does. First of all current dynamics of cultural wins of right-wing ideas in Ukraine based on rearrangement of heroical cliches taken from Stalin’s national politics. Overexploitation of paradigm of oppressed Ukrainian nation, culture, language and fight for independence comes from national-building myth. This myth centered for militant and nationalistic groups around times of the Second World War and activities of the *UPA*. In this myth Stepan Bandera is a main hero and guerrillas struggle in the Western Ukraine against *Red Army*, poles *Armia Ludowa* and *Armia Krajowa* and all the “enemies” of Ukrainian nation are a heroic golden age. Curiosity is warmed by mystification of destroyed documents. Common sense based on family stories about Soviet State brutality against dissidence described in contemporary secondary schools books aimed to grew up patriotism and love to the Ukrainian state.

Secondly the crash of the USSR in 1991 does not help to change a structural principles. It does not actually demolish bureaucratic apparatus. The crash only gives more power and possibilities for local Soviet Ukraine leadership. Cultural politic was turned upside down from ideology of glorification Soviet Union and Communist Party to ideology of stigmatization of all 70 years of Soviet history. Politicum and society started to search for national identities in contrast to Soviet historical tradition. Which was intensified by insult of Russian domination above

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5 Basically heros and antiheros are just swaped

6 Ukrainian insurgent army
Ukraine. New ideology structured on binary opposition of bad Russian Imperialism as a big cruel figure of oppressor and a good independent Ukrainian Nation/State as oppressed. But only when oppressor will be demolished oppressed could feel satisfaction.

Finally a great success of political rally called Orange revolution was driven by the same as 1990s hope for better life with under the rule of liberal democrat but was structured on the idea of the proud for the nation. Democracy of Victor Yuschenko was a political populism focused on glorification and honorable memorisation of Famine victims, insisting on the accept of it as the Henocide of Ukrainian nation. For Yuschenko’s perspective fault must be putted on Russian Federation as assignee of USSR. This Henocide politics was also way to decrease political influence of Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy and increese influence of other Ukrainian Christian confessions.

Although Orange revolution disappointed its supporters. Its symbols and ideals such as patriotism, language issue, heritage and proud for the nation could be easily found both in far-right rhetorics and in common apolitical everyday discourse. Current economical situation brought Ukrainian society to unconscious support of ideas of hate and xenophobia.

Groups and parties

Existence of right wing groups is closely connected with declaration of Independence of Ukrainian state on the ruins of the Soviet union in 1990-1991. Perestroika liberalisation of the late 1980s helps Ukrainian nationalism and patriotism to come to a politicum. Hunger-strike encampment uprising organized in November-October of 1990 started as a movement for political and economical independence from USSR easily was rearticulate to a national Independence.

On this wave one of the most known nationalist party in Ukraine Svooba (Freedom) party was established in 1991 and registered in 5 years as a political party named Social-National party of Ukraine. For the first decade of their activity, party did not get big success. At the beginning of 2004 aiming to join political establishment they made radically rebranding of the party. They soften their view, symbolics and rhetorics. But still proclaimed to form their identity in contrast to soviet past horrors, emotions structured on soviet trauma. In 2009-2010 on regional elections party unexpectedly succeeded and got majority in four western regions of Ukraine. Moreover, in 2012 party got almost 11% on Parliament elections.

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7 Which was continued in Soviet times in a different form

8 Changed Wolfsganangel to a finger Trident, changed their name from SNPU to Svoboda and rewrote their political programme to more liberal and populistic.
At the same time to parliamentary and electoral work Party started to develop their presence in street political activism. Svoboda youth leadership in Kyiv and Lviv took a course to collaborate with subcultural far-right and neo-nazi groups. The party protected right wing groups and together with them had been trying to participate and squat all the social and civic activities to get more political profit and trying to push out leftist and liberals⁹. Party still calls its ideology Social-Nationalism. MPs often act as right-wing populists and propose corresponding law projects, e.g. ban on propaganda of homosexuality, death penalty, restoration of nuclear weapon, “ethnicity” line in passport, ban of abortion etc. No one of them were not approve yet.

**Social-National Assembly** (former name Patriot of Ukraine) is more radical and openly racist group. It was a paramilitary wing of SNPU (Svoboda) and had separated from it in 2004 as reaction on rebranding. Since that time they focused their activity in Kharkiv. Using racist rhetoric PU/SNA organized actions against Vietnamese diaspora¹⁰.

SNA is well-know by their radical and militant rhetoric which can be defined as more classical kind Nazism. They appeal to build authoritarian natiocracy imperialist state and reconquest part of Russian Federation, Moldova etc. territories which they think as ethnically/historically Ukrainian. In 2011 SNA came under pressure of authorities which they interpretive as repressions. In Kharkiv group few members of leadership were arrested after fighting and shooting which was criminal/intraparty motivated. In Kyiv few leaders were arrested and accused in preparing terrorist attack, was arrested¹¹. These people were indirect collaborating with Party of Regions and local criminals on regional elections in 2010¹². Vasylkiv terrorists were amnestied together with Yulia Tymoshenko as a political prisoners. Some leaders are collaborated with Oleh Lyashko and his Radical party and had won a position in Kyiv Municipality.

Stepan Bandera’s **Tryzub** (Trident) is more likely conservative traditionalist than neo-nazi group. Founded in 1993 as militant wing of political party Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists¹³. But in 1999 Tryzub completely separated from KUN and

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⁹ That happen with movement Save Old Kyiv and did not happened with Students campaign Against Cuts. Svoboda protected street gang group C14 (also can be read like “Sich”) which used to a systematic attacks on leftist activists, LGBTQ+ actions and sometimes migrants.

¹⁰ There are suggestions that struggling Vietnamese traders on markets were connect with Ukrainian criminals, which tried to control these markets.

¹¹ and push ahead campaign for their freedom under the name of Vasylkiv (name of city in Kyiv region) terrorists

¹² especially as body guard for current comic major Kernes

¹³ look for analogy with Svoboda/SNPU – PU
acted as independent group. Major part of their activity was cultural\textsuperscript{14}, sports and propagandistic. Organization proclaimed itself as medieval orden and didn’t participate in “real politics”, members didn’t get any state positions. Substantial part of Tryzub’ ideology is Christianity. At the end of 2010 militants consider their activity on war against Soviet monuments. About ten members of Tryzub were convicted of ruining few monuments. Organization marginalized while the nationalist fraction of Svoboda party entered Parliament.

Dmytro Korchinskiy’s \textit{Bratstvo} party was registered in the year 2005 and had never gotten electoral success. But it is more political-technology project of Korchinskiy who was one of the leaders of UNSO (excluded in 1998) and participated in military conflicts in Transdnistria, Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh and Chechnya. Korchinsky balanced on postmodern crossroad of Orthodox Christianity fundamentalism, anarchism, nationalism and well-known as political provocateur\textsuperscript{15}. In 2008 Bratstvo collaborated with SNA/PU tried to held UPA Memory March. The rally ended with fight with police and arrest of about 150 people. Since that time Bratstvo collaborates from time to time with neo-nazis from SNA.

Mobilization sphere for organized far-right groups in Ukraine from early 2000\textsuperscript{th} became subcultural circles of \textit{football hooligans}. They were copying experience of Russian and Europe. And there are only few exceptions like non-racist or anti-racist football supporters groups. Far-right football ultras were majority participants of hate motivated crimes and sometimes connected with referred to above political groups. There were also examples when football ultras were hired by some commercials or politicians to resist civic activity and they were forced to struggle or even fight with their political companions.

Summing up we can say that far-righths who come to participate in Euromaidan were not well organized and structured, only Svoboda Party has had structure and administrative sources. They were expecting for a great success, but their populism does not pass expectation of radical actions. That lead to decrease of their popularity and electorial potential, as we can see after all on the results of presidents elections.

\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless Tryzub was more interested in history of \textit{Organization of Ukrainian Nationalist} from 1920s calling themselves descendants of OUN integral nationalism.

\textsuperscript{15} Since early 2000th he collaborate with pro-Russian politicians as Victor Medvedchuk and Nataliya Vitrenko. From 2005 till 2007 he was member of high council of International Euroasian Movement leading by Alexandr Dugin. In 2005 Korchinsky read a lection “How to resist urban disorders” in pro-Putin camp in Russia.
Russian nationalism in Ukraine

Highlight point is that for long time in Ukraine there were both pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian (we’ll call them Russian nationalist next) far-rights\textsuperscript{16}. It was a consequence of cultural imperialist politics of Russian Empire and during some periods of Soviet age. We will not describe every group because some of them were only virtual, some changed names and united/split. We’d rather talk about common trend in general.

Such groups in Ukraine were spread mostly in Eastern, Southern regions and in Crimea. Russian and Ukrainian nationalists in Ukraine united by intention to have a strong authoritarian state/empire, traditional values, xenophobia\textsuperscript{17}. Sometimes they even collaborate over these topics. Russian nationalists in Ukraine often support Orthodox Church of Moscow patriarchy. Position on modern authority in RF depends, but in general “strong hand” politics is supported. Sometimes these groups had material support from Russia, but not always. Some of them were more militant\textsuperscript{18} and some tried to act in more official way. Their turning point is reference to the Soviet interpretation of the history. While supporting Whites during Civil war in Russian Empire, Russian nationalists also appeal to Great victory trend\textsuperscript{19}.

Neo-liberal \textit{Party of Regions} using some points from cultural program of Russian nationalists. During Euromaidan this kind of nationalism became an alternative for people which didn’t support protest. And when \textit{PR} completely lost structure and support even in their traditional supporting regions more radical and more violet Russian nationalism, which transform into armed insurgence. Since getting independence Kyiv’s authority didn’t provide any effective integration politics for pro-Russian population\textsuperscript{20}. So militants of Russian nationalist groups in

\textsuperscript{16}E.g. look for “Extremism in South-Eastern Ukraine” by Anton Shekhovtsov

\textsuperscript{17} not only against each other, but together against Commis, Jews, Roma, Caucasians, LGBTQ+ etc.

\textsuperscript{18} Pictures from military training of “Donetsk Republic group” in 2009: https://vk.com/album-3223620_95208996

\textsuperscript{19} Victory in Great Patriotic war 1941-1945. This is consequence of Stalin’ conservative historiography which put a follow line between Russian Empire and Stalinist Soviet union. And victory is interpreted here like a “victory of Russian arms”, “victory on Western world”, “building a great state”. Fascism here loses its politic-economic characteristics and interpreted only as violent foreign invasion. That’s why “Father-Tsar” and “great Soviet past” are not mutual in rhetoric of Russian nationalists in Ukraine.

\textsuperscript{20} Good example is Crimea where majority (not such big as results of referendum), we can suggest, identify themselves more with Russia than with Ukraine. And leader of not so popular political party Russian unity Sergey Aksenov became a self-proclaimed Prime Minister. In Donetsk region marginal nationalist group Donetsk Republic became inspiratory of armed Donetsk People’ Republic of
Ukraine today became a basis of pro-Russian insurgent’ military and political structure.

Within Russian nationalist groups in Ukraine we can also mention Communist Party of Ukraine. This party did always stand on pro-Russian conservative positions in cultural politics. In the same time party voted for pro-market changes in a coalition with Party of Regions. Majority of CPU’s supporters are elder people who votes for their soviet memories.

We can summarize that while clear anticommunist position of insurgent’ leadership, they do not protrude using some Soviet symbolic and rhetoric, without appealing to economic, internationalism, October revolution etc. It looks like kind of populism to get support from locals who think that during soviet times region used to be more welfare. Attraction of Russian nationalism by Eastern Ukraine population has a complex reason. On one side it is a reaction to Ukrainian chauvinism which were used on Euromaidan and by new authority, on the other side it is a desire for a “strong hand”. Also it is consequence of propaganda (including Russian media) work and mass disorientation of population in industrial regions with bad living and working conditions. It is also rejection of “liberal pro-European way of development”.

Far-rights participate Euromaidan

Other far-right groups were not so numerous and organized so at first they acted in common discourse of association with EU (than common demand changed a lot to an anti-police, anti-government and anti-president). Critique of neo-liberal project of EU sounded marginal both from far-rights and from leftist participating protest

There was not something like one Euromaidan, but 4 waves, 4 different protests with different participant, demands, slogans and goals. On 30th of November less massive Euromaidan gathered only around pro-EU ideas was beaten by police. The very next morning everything changes hundreds of thousands joined the protest with main motos against police brutality eurointegration came on the second turn. And after re-occupying square Eromaidan has separated (even geographical) on two parts – one one square there were political parliamentary

nowadays. And formed member of Russian neo-Nazi group Russian National Unity in Ukraine became a “People’ governor” of Donetsk.

21 At the same time conflict and fights between far-rights (mostly Tryzub) and leftists on the ground as both participated with different goals and demands had been happening from the very beginning of Euromaidan in November 2013. At that time incidents were not a point of interest for media which supported protest, nobody cares. This conflicts were interpreter as something marginal not important, something we should keep silence about not wash dirty linen in public.

22 Such protest were organized by political parties but weren’t control by them.
opposition parties and the other civic students, ngo’s. There were negotiations between these sides. In party’ protest nationalism was represented by Svoboda, but “civic nationalists” haven’t subjectivisation. That’s why Tryzub and few other groups opposing Svoboda decided to create an “umbrella” initiative to coordinate and represent intentions of pro-nationalist protesters, which are non-sympathize Svoboda populism. This initiative they called Right Sector. From the very beginning they identify themselves as non-party and militant.

As protest had been escalated and became more violent Svoboda party permanently had been losing its support. And vice versa Right Sector had been getting more and more popular. While Oleh Tiahnybok tries to play parliamentary game, Dmytro Yarosh schooling city guerrilleros. And finally as Euromaidan peaceful protest transformed into clashes with police and violent riots second one got a victory. Majority of protesters didn’t support radical nationalism as well. We can say majority even don’t understand or try to find out what does nationalists in Ukraine proclaim. There were some discussions and conflicts but almost invisible behind of violent direct action. In general we can describe common way of transformation Maidan protestor’s demands from pro-EU through anti-police brutality to more and more grass root democratic and antiauthoritarian (not looking to official parties’ positions) with wave-form impact of nationalism. This logic was not good both for anti-Maidan establishment and pro-Maidan conservative part. So usually mainstream media simplify negotiation as struggle between Yanukovych power and far-rights fascists. It was not representative both by quantity and quality measure. But this trend had influence to common opinion.

From the very beginning far-rights were minority in protest, but well organized minority. We can sum up that main reasons of getting ideological hegemony in (Euro)Maidan protest by radical nationalists:

* establishing coalition out of smaller groups, well organized and structured with a clear political goal Right Sector;

* focus on violent struggle and direct action which was accepted by common sense as an proper fight back on police brutality, kidnaping and killing protesters, especially youth;

* administrative resources of Svoboda party (positions, influence to media, money);

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23 because involving nationalist and nazis who supported Svoboda before and common people impressed by paramilitary organisation doing direct actions

* simplification of struggle into binary opposition far-rights/authority and appropriating of this interpretation by common protesters;
* articulation of Yanukovych regime with soviet style of state administration and cultural politics;
* narrowing perspective of alternatives to Soviet past in one solution in Nationalism
* un-ability of common protesters and civic encampment of the square to subjectivise their political voice.

Nobody cared parliamentary politician rally speeches on a stage. But attempts of critical discussion on situation, movement, future were more or less marginal. That’s why nationalist forms (not always content) became acceptable for many of protesters.

**After Maidan**

Direct confrontation of new Ukrainian authority represented by neo-liberals and nationalists and Putin’s Russia make European nationalists to decide whom to support. Before Euromaidan *Svoboda* party had close connection with European far-rights\(^{25}\). Finally majority of formed *Svoboda’s* allies became standing on pro-Russian position and isolate Ukrainian nationalists on international level. Only very few European far-rights groups stands on pro-Ukrainian position. Also Russian nationalists separated on Ukrainian question. For some groups struggle against Putin and modern project of RF was reason to support Euromaidan. But some supported annexation of Crimea and pro-Russian insurgency in Ukraine as part of spreading Russian World and recover of Empire.

Results of President election on May 25\(^{th}\) 2014 were predicted before. Petro Poroshenko ex-minister of Yanukovych’ Government and oligarch got almost 55% and won in first tour. Results of nationalist candidates were negligible compared to rise of support (of nationalist rhetoric) among population. Oleh Tyahnybok got a little more than 1% and Dmytro Yarosh got a little less.

In case of *Svoboda* party we can suggest that it was a result of complex loss of support as consequence of their parliamentary politics, local politics in Western regions and activity during Euromaidan. *Right Sector* was popular during violent confrontation in Kyiv as most militant group. But there were not a real reasons to elect Yarosh as President even for his soft supporters. And popularity of *Right Sector* was exaggerated by media (especially Russian). Finally big part of electorate

\(^{25}\) http://www.academia.edu/4402918/The_old_and_new_European_friends_of_Ukraines_far-right_Svoboda_party
decided to vote for Poroshenko as compromise candidate to held elections in one tour.

More important was success of right-wing populist Oleh Lyashko, who got 3rd place with more than 8% of votes. He wasn’t high ranking politician before and was known only by ridiculous acts. But during elections he used strong patriotic and militarist rhetoric. After Euromaidan he began to collaborate with neo-nazis from SNA, helped to release their prisoners and even put some of them in his party list on Kyiv regional elections. Such a big rate of support of right-wing populism shows as common opinion moves right without voting for formal nationalists.

The other trend that moved common opinion to the right was militarisation of civic activity and public political actions. On one hand military aesthetics and on the other hand real armed insurgency on the East almost removed peaceful convenient demonstrations from focus of media and public attention. Militarization, vandalism and domination of direct action came into daily life in Ukraine. And this trend is relevant not only for far-rights. Real militarisation of political groups can be seen in a number of initiatives and participants of paramilitary voluntary units taking part in Antiterrorist operation (ATO). The most successful in this sphere is SNA supplied by Lyashko and lead Azov voluntary battalion. In future they will be armed, skilled and socially respected as heroes by society. Even now some paramilitary units participates raider seizure of business.

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26 Other far-rights is also working in this direction.

27 Ihor Kolomoisky which donate a lot of money to pro-Ukrainian paramilitary groups in a fact build his own private army which is formally subordinated but badly controlled by Interior Affairs and Armed forces Ministry.
Italian extreme and radical right wing: an overview

Antonio Albanese

Italian political field has always been featured by the presence of radical and extreme parties and groups form the end of the World War II on.

Italy was the only country where we might have met the strongest western block communist party and a neo-fascist party sat in the same parliament from 1948.

MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano) was indeed fund on the 26th of December 1946. After one year after the tragic end of the fascist regime Italian parties and the Allies didn’t inhibit the birth of a neo-fascist party. From that moment on the nostalgic galaxy of fascist groups and militants find a safe place to play politics. Until the end of the 1950’s MSI remained the only neo-fascist party in the country and without considering small groups which had a very brief political life, it played quit an hegemony on the radical and extreme Italian right-wing. With the beginning of the 1960’s instead different groups started to abandon MSI judging it too moderate and looking for the creation of a revolutionary chance which could restore a fascist regime not only in Italy but all over Europe. This European choice was seen not only as the unique way to build a fascist regime really alternative both to communism and to capitalism but also the only way to fight back SSR imperialism. The concept of Europe-Nation began a strong narrative for groups such as Jeune Europe, Ordine Nuovo, Avanguardia Nazionale, Alleanza Cattolica Tradizionalista and others.

We are here aiming to briefly describe a milieu, a cultural effervescence which affected the extreme and radical right wing groups in Italy in order to better understand the political positions of the Italian right wing today.

Before going ahead it is crucial to clarify the categories use of extreme and radical referred to a political group: following Linz studies on totalitarianism and authoritarianism we define as radical a group which as strong and often
revolutionary statements and agenda without exercising violent behaviours and as extreme a violent group, a group which actively perform violence as a political tool.

We are aiming indeed to draw a very fast draft from which it is possible to understand the three main features of Italian (and actually not only Italian) which characterised the extremist or radical movements we are looking at:

I. Racism, both in biological and “spiritual” terms: referring to anti-Islam movements but also to the classic anti-Semitism

II. Europe as the minimum size level of the quest in their looking for common values which allows the right-wing to overthrown the classic notion of nationalism

III. The political discourse about the economic and financial crisis and the usage of populist register to spread an old vision of capitalism.

Racism and the idea of tradition

Julius Evola, the most important fascist thinker active in Italy before during and especially after the war was the mentor of many neo-fascist group and especially Ordine Nuovo. He was wounded during the war and he spent the rest of his life on a wheelchair engaged in his studies on concept of tradition. His thought was indeed complex and sophisticated and it is not difficult to imagine how fascinating it could be for a group of young students searching for a way out from the traditional fascism they met within MSI. The whole philosophical work of Evola is based on two main point that we would like just to enumerate here: tradition is may be the key word to better understand Evola’s approach to the world. He was very fond with oriental philosophies as Buddhism and Hinduism. He developed a systematic critique against modernity. According to Evola history is a circular force which make the world to rise up until the golden ages and at the same time it precipitates into darkness of ignorance. Ignorance for Evola was a wider concept which consisted in the incapability of men of understanding the right way and the real rules which should ruled societies. The first and most important among those rules was the one on tradition as foundational power. Just to run a sample that could

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help in understanding Evola was fascist, even if he never signed any party card, but he was against the Social Republic of Salò because monarchy was according to him one of the way in which men could rightly live in a traditional way.

The very base of Evola’s thought, and the second crucial point we are simply enumerating here, was the spiritual conception of life according to which every man has a specific role he has to stick to during his life if he wants to fully live his destiny. This spiritual point of view shaped the whole Italian philosopher agenda and even his racial ideals were based upon it. He developed what has been called spiritual racism even during the 1930's and he was always critique against Nazi biological racism not because he was not anti-Semitic but because in his idea there was a spiritual hierarchy\textsuperscript{29}. This idea of finding the very roots of the western civilisation stands until today in some neo-fascist organisation: just as a sample we might recall here the strong Catholic agenda carried out by Forza Nuova. They indeed claims Catholicism as the core of European and western civilisation being, some of them not Catholic at all; but the Church as both, an institution and a doctrine, is a safe bastion for the simple ones who need to be guided.

This was the ideological and theoretical background which ON militants were trained to and that somehow guided their political choices. It was not a case if ON watchword was: a community of believers and fighters. On militants were not searching for a “simple” political engagement but for a way of life, they wanted a religion a complex systematic though which were able to offer to neo-fascism a way out from the mere contrast between the US and the USSR.

This peculiar approach towards the world order lead us immediately to our second point; the one about Europe and the process of unification process which was among others one of the issue faced by the international neo-fascist movement in the 1960’s.

\textsuperscript{29} J. Evola, \textit{Indirizzi per una educazione razziale}, Conte, Naples, first edition 1941.
Europe-Nation: an international nationalism

In 1962 a Belgian trade union leader, Jean Thiriart, settled down a new political group, namely Jeune Europe. Before describing the very nature of this group it is important to look at who his leader was.

Jean Thiriart joined a first national-Bolshevism group during the 1930's and he entered into an association called Amis du Grand Reich allemand (friends of German wide Reich) during the war times. This group, organised by former communist elements who suffered the fascination of Hitler's national-socialism, was the first real political experience of the young Jean and those times deeply shaped his political thought. Jean Thiriart was, indeed, a theorist of the national-bolshevism and he believed in a pan-European nationalism. After the war he spent three years in jail for collaboration with the enemy. He didn't play any politics until 1960 when he found an association which fought against the de-colonisation process which was taking place all over the world including Congo the former Belgian colony. He argued that the loss of colonies for the European countries was the proof of the double imperialism put in place by the two superpowers. According to his texts Europeans were abandoning Africans in US-SSR's clutches instead of keeping in its natural mission of helping the development of continent. The alliance with OAS members was, starting from this point of view, quite obvious.

Thiriart understood quite soon that the fight could not be fought with the old weapons of nationalism and in 1962 he decided to found a new political group called Jeune Europe (Young Europe). He argued that Europe should have become a third force between US and SSR. He proposed to build a communitarian Europe which refused both socialism and capitalism. In other words he tried to revitalise Hitler's idea. He was also the first leader who, quoting Ortega y Gasset, theorised the useless of categories as right and left wing in politics.

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30 AGA, National Movement Funds. Foreign Service, 42/8916.4. It is present in archive an entire folder about Jovem Europa and this document we quote here it is dated 11 of April 1969 and it describes the activities of different neofascist groups in Europe in the previous years.
Jeune Europe grew fast and it spread in more than 11 countries around Europe, Spain and Italy included. It is important to underline that in both countries JE militants were mostly university students already involved in politics.

It is not difficult to trace back some of those items into Lega Nord or other radical and extreme right wing parties; we also should take into account that Mario Borghezio, one of the most prominent Lega Nord leader spent a considerable time within JE in Italy. The old Nazi idea of a European unification process under the black flag was a dream they always had. A continent ruled by fascism which rejected democracy as a political system and financial capitalism in economy. It is not a case if one of the most important neo-fascist group CasaPound shaped its identity against the idea of bank system. Banks, and not the capitalist system as a whole, were always pointed as the enemy by fascism; the plutocratic plot organised by the Jew who ruled the world was one of fascist mainstream discourse and in time of crisis such this one, is not difficult for extreme right wing to make a political profit out of the inequalities and dramas lived by millions of persons through all Europe.

**Bank system, financial and social crisis in the right wing discourse**

Fascism was never an anti-capitalist movement. As Angelo Tasca used to describe it in his book fascism was a composite ideology that brought different elements from socialism, nationalism and other cultural streams; in order to define it we should look at what it did and against who; in this respect fascism chose a primary enemy, the working class and its organisations. Using a kind of Schmittian approach the Italian intellectual labelled fascism in a very effective way; fascism was a reactionary force supported by European bourgeoisie against socialist ideals that were marching from East. At the same time from the end of the 1920's ahead Mussolini himself attacked strongly the other western countries guilty at his eyes of blocking the territorial and political Italian expansion. The myth of a great nation blocked in its natural and holy expectations by the old capitalist forces, especially UK, push Mussolini to adopt a strong anti-capitalist rhetoric. The idea of economical self sustainability and on the absence of class struggle within a corporative system strength some elements which are still present in neo-fascism propaganda.
Many neo-fascist organisations and groups kept these ideas and used them to analyse the several crises western countries went through all along decades; MSI itself until the beginning of the 1990’s officially remained stuck to this position: in economy no agreement with capitalism and free market was possible. Almirante used to say during a European electoral campaign in 1984 that the only way to build a solid Europe was to refuse both models; communist, of course, but also capitalism funded on a pervert idea of profit which was opposite to the idea of national community\textsuperscript{31}.

The national community Almirante was talking about at that time was already a European one. From the beginning of the 1950’s MSI joined the European Social Movement the first tempt to establish international connections and cooperation with other neo-fascist parties and groups\textsuperscript{32}.

As a matter of fact both fascism and neo-fascism were strongly supported by bourgeoisie in order to fight against communism; fascism never socialise any productive plant despite its propaganda.

In the current Italian scenario CPI made the same statements shouting at banks and austerity measures claiming a European union which protect its own economy in the struggle with emerging countries as Brazil or China. They are de facto supporting a European protectionism against neo-liberism and a segregationist policies which strongly divide people who lives in the same country into rigid ghettos. Starting from their own brand they use the name of Pound to criticise bank system claiming the house property as an holy one; these kind of slogans had some appeal among the weakest ones who lost sometime even their own places because of the crisis\textsuperscript{33}.

\textsuperscript{31} Piero Ignazi, *Il polo escluso. Profilo del Movimento Sociale Italiano*, Bologna, il Mulino, 1989
\textsuperscript{33} For a longer analysis on CasaPound look at: Albanese and others, *Fascisti di un altro Millennio? Crisi e partecipazione in CasaPound*, Bonanno editore, 2014
Right wing extremism in Austria

Natascha Strobl

Introduction

In this discussion paper I am going to outline the major development steps of right-wing extremism in Austria. First I am going to give a definition of the term itself, then I am going to present an overview of the post WWII-era and recent developments. The main focus is based around the rise of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) since it is the absolute center of right wing extremism in Austria.

Definition

The term right-wing extremism is not used in the sense of the “Extremismustheorie”, which is the mainstream theory about neofascism und right wing extremism in Germany and Austria. In this theory the basis is a societal center, which is regarded as “good” in a moral sense. Within this center (nearly) every mainstream party is included. It is threatened by two small but dangerous extremes on both sides of the center. This would be left wing extremism and right wing extremism. I reject this theory on three grounds. First of all it does not distinguish “threats” to society on the basis of ideology. People rejecting the current model in which society is organized because of a lack of democratic participation and those who want to abolish all democratic participation are considered “extreme” regardless of their ideology. Secondly this theory fails to recognize antidemocratic, racist, anti-feminist, anti-Semitic and so on discourses within the so called mainstream. Thirdly it is a tool of repression against leftist who wish to change the current society into a more equal one.

I keep using the term “Right wing extremism” nonetheless, because it is commonly used and understood. My definition of right wing extremism is based on the analysis of the right wing ideology. Right wing extremism is henceforth defined as an ideology that has its basis in (thought) inequality and anti-egalitarianism. Those patterns of thought are justified by pseudo-biological “facts”. In newer strategies
“cultural” justifications are used. In this line of thought people are not primarily divided by “race” but by “culture”. In conclusion culture and race are used synonymously by modern right-wing-extremists. “Race” as a word has become a taboo in the German language, so “culture” provides an alternative.

Right-wing extremism is the generic term for all kinds of ideology that provide anti-egalitarian views on society. Neo-fascism and neo-national socialism are the two prominent current right-wing ideologies. That said it should not be forgotten that there do exist more of them within very conservative and religious groups. Also it is important to stress that discourses can function in a right wing extremist logic, too. The very shrill discourse about immigration in the media has certain right wing extremist elements, even though the authors are not right wing extremists themselves. Those discourses are a boost for right wing extremists groups nonetheless.

The rise of the Freedom Party (FPÖ)

The FPÖ is the successor of the Federation of Independents. The Federation of Independents saw itself as a party representing the interests of former members of the Nazi-party (NSDAP). One of its main focuses was to fight the “Verbotsgesetz”, a law which prohibits national socialist propaganda. In 1953 the Federations of the Independent was absorbed by the newly founded Austrian Liberation party. The FPÖ always consisted of two rivaling wings – a more liberal one and a German nationalist one. Their first participation in government was from 1980-1986. In that time the FPÖ was led by the more (neo) liberal wing. In 1986 Jörg Haider rose to power within the party propagating nationalist and right wing views. In the next 14 years gained more influence for the FPÖ and came in second at the 2000 election. Together with the Conservative People’s Party the FPÖ formed a government for the next five years. After a lost struggle for power Haider split from the FPÖ and formed a new party, the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ). Heinz Christian Strache became the new chairman of the FPÖ. His agitation is comparable to the pre-government years of Haider. During the government participation the academic fraternities lost their influence within the party so the y championed Strache as the new leader. Strache brought the FPÖ back in track of an open racist and
nationalistic course. In the presidential election of 2010 Barbara Rosenkranz ran for office for the FPÖ. She is an icon of the German nationalistic wing of the FPÖ and has been an outspoken anti-feminist. During the campaign she had to sign a paper which said that she acknowledged that the holocaust actually did happen due to media pressure.

Election results

| National Council | 1986 | 9,7% | 1996 | 27,5% |
| 1990 | 16,6% | 1999 | 23,4% |
| 1994 | 22,5% | 2004 | 6,3% |
| 1995 | 22,0% | 2009 | 12,7% |
| 1999 | 26,9% | 2014 | 19,7% |
| 2002 | 10,0% | |
| 2006 | 11,0% | |
| 2008 | 17,5% | |
| 2013 | 20,5% | |

**Academic fraternities**

The student fraternities (“Burschenschaften”) were formed in the beginning of the 19th century in university cities throughout what later became the German Reich. From the beginning their ideology was nationalistic and “völkisch” (roughly translated: racial, but the basis is not an entire “race” but a people bounded by blood and fate. This belief became to be the very core of Nazi ideology a century later.). The goal of the fraternities was the unification of all lands they deemed “German” and the enemies that stood in their way soon became clear: the ideas of 1789 and the French per se as well as Jewish people. So right at the beginning of the formation of the right-wing student fraternities, anti-Anti-Semitism played a decisive role. The second cornerstone of the Burschenschaften is their self-conception as “Männerbund”. ‘Männerbund’ means that only men are allowed to take part in the fraternities. The ideological-theoretical justification for this exclusion lies in their misogynist belief that women are not ‘pure’ enough to be a part of these groups. This idea was theorized by the interwar nationalist ideologue Hans Blüher and become propagated through not only the Burschenschaften but also the German ‘Jugendbewegung’ (youth movement) of the interwar period.
While a very weak “liberal” wing of the fraternity movement also emerged at the beginning of the 19th century, it became irrelevant as early as 1817. At the Wartburgfest in the same year the Burschenschaften gathered to burn books of French, Jewish, and progressive authors they deemed anti-German.

Austrian Burschenschaften (who thought of themselves as German and still do) formed as late as the 1860s. They never even had a liberal wing, but were among the most ruthless and völkisch ones. They were the first to adopt the “Arierparagraph”—a prerequisite (still implicitly applied in some fraternities) that only male students deemed Aryan are allowed to join—as early as in the 1890s. Although these Austrian Burschenschaften see themselves as victims of the Third Reich, the opposite is true. They were not banned, as they claim, but willingly disbanded and regrouped into the Nationalsozialistische Studentenbund, the student organization of the NSDAP, which sought a monopoly on student representation. Many high-ranked Nazis were fraternity members in Austria and Germany, such as Adolf Eichmann or Irmfried Eberl, camp commander of the extermination camp Treblinka. In the post-war era Burschenschaften became a decisive player within organized right-wing extremism in Austria and Germany.

Specific circumstances

Austria did not have a “denazification”-process like Germany. The Allies declared Austria neutral after WWII and did not install any reeducation programs. Thus the lie of being “the first victim of the Nazi occupation” was a cornerstone of Austrian post war society. This was drawn into question only in the 1980s, when a societal discourse about the involvement of Austria in the Nazi regime arose.

The media landscape is very limited. Public-service broadcasting has a near monopoly position in the television- and radio-sector. The same can be said for the privately owned “Kronen Zeitung” when it comes to newspapers. The “Kronen Zeitung” is known for its harsh stance on immigration issues. It played a decisive role in the rise of Jörg Haider and also H.C. Strache. Additionally there is no leftist
newspaper of importance in Austria except for the Viennese street newspaper “Augustin”.

The FPÖ as networking agent

The FPÖ has not only stabilized their position in Austria but is also very actively connecting various right wing to right wing extremist parties in Europe. It has close ties to the Vlaams Belang (Belgium) and the Front National (France). Members of both parties visited the ball of the student fraternities that is held every year at the end of January. It is one of the most important right wing networking events in Europe. Members of various parties attend as well as notorious activists such as David Irving, who denies the Holocaust, or Frank Rennicke, famous neo-Nazi singer/songwriter. Currently the FPÖ is trying to reform the European alliance for Freedom (EAF), a group within the European parliament together with Vlaams Belang and Front National. They have not succeeded until now. In 2014 a youth section of the EAF was founded – Young European Alliance for hope (YEAH). It consists of the three mentioned parties and the Swedish Democrats. YEAH is currently inactive. The FPÖ also has close ties to Russia. In June 2014 a conference of a far right wing Christian group called “Holy alliance” was held in Vienna. Alexander Dugin, one of the closest advisers to the Russian government, attended as well as H.C. Strache and several other members of the FPÖ.

Recent developments in extraparliamentary right wing extremism

Due to the strength of the Austrian Freedom Party extraparliamentary right wing extremism in Austria has never gained such a decisive force as in Germany for example. Nonetheless during the past few years the number of crimes with right wing extremist back ground has grown rapidly. So called “Kameradschaften”, unofficially organized Austrian neo-Nazi groups are in regular contact to their German counterparts. RAC concerts are organized across all borders in the Alpine-region. Recently Austrian neo-Nazis have been found to be entangled in organized crime, too which was shown by the example of “Objekt 21”, an estate owned by neo-Nazis where right wing concerts took place as well as criminal actions. On the other hand neo-Nazi websites like alpen-donau-info have been active for several years now, even though there have been sentences in the past. The so called
“Identitarian Movement” has gained popularity within the last two years by propagating a seemingly soft form of right wing extremism by developing and modernizing the strategies of the older generation of the so called New Right. By using popular cultural references, an appeal to youth, corporate identity and the primacy of action that they always manage to become a popular alternative to old fashioned parties and their youth organizations. Austria can be seen as one of the most active places for “Identitarians” as they are able to fill a space which has been left out by the Freedom Party. The “Identitarians” are able to reach out for the indecisive youth which calls itself “apolitical”, the ones who have a right wing ideology without calling themselves thusly.

**Conclusion**

The FPÖ is the key actor in right wing extremism in Austria. She has or tries to have the control over every development. One factor of their success is that they always managed to incorporate extrapalliamentary activism into party structures or at least maintained a very close relationship. This can especially be seen at alpen-donau.info. A member of the parliament for the FPÖ gave information to this neo-Nazi-website.

The FPÖ shows how dangerous it is when a right wing extremist party can flourish and even is invited to participate in government(s). The success of the FPÖ is also founded in harsh racist and anti-immigration discourses in the media, dictated by the “Kronen Zeitung”. Recent polls show the FPÖ on a solid first place. Additionally we see criminalization of antifascism on a new scale in Austria. A student was found guilty of breach of the public peace for attending the demonstrations against the ball of the student fraternities. The police meets antifascist demonstrations with a brutality that is quite uncommon for Austrian circumstances.